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Students of the First Amendment continually read the Amendment 
out of the Constitution-not in the sense of denying it effect, but in the 
sense of reading it in isolation, uninformed by the broader principles 
embedded in the founding document. Underneath all the differences 
among the vast range of free speech scholars, most commentators 
share a fundamental and flawed premise: that the First Amendment is 
t Counsel, House Committee on the judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Crim-
inal justice. The opinions contained in this article are mine alone and are in no way 
intended to reflect the views of my employers. Many of the ideas in this article were 
developed in conversations with Diana Fortuna. An earlier version was delivered at the 
Yale Student Legal Theory Workshop; I am grateful to the participants, particularly 
janine Crawley, for their provocative suggestions. Owen Fiss, Jon Hanson, Tom 
Hentoff, Robert Schapiro, and Lester Yassky read this article in draft and provided help-
ful comments. My primary intellectual debt is to Bruce Ackerman, on whose work this 
article hopes to build. 
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concerned solely with governmental regulation of speech.l 
This sort of "clau'se-bound" interpretation2 ignores the larger pur-
poses underlying the First Amendment. The First Amendment is not a 
lone prohibition on speech restrictions. Its guarantee that "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" 
cannot be properly interpreted without appreciating the role the provi-
sion plays in the constitutional plan. The people who drafted and en-
acted the First Amendment sought not only to protect speech rights, 
but also to reinforce and implement the core constitutional structures 
of separated powers and federalism. As these constitutional structures 
have changed, so too has the meaning and purpose of the First Amend-
ment. Questions about how much speech the Amendment allows can 
be answered only by understanding the connections between the Free 
Speech Clause and more fundamental constitutional decisions about 
the allocation of political power. Recovering these links will be a pri-
mary goal of this Article. 
The Article's method will be to review the history of the First 
Amendment. As we shall see, the familiar history of the Amendment is 
highly misleading-or perhaps I should say both familiar histories, for 
there are in fact two different versions. The first version, the one 
taught in grade schools, emphasizes the Founders' commitment to tol-
erance: the vindication of John Peter Zenger, the Enlightenment spirit 
of the Revolution, and so forth. As every schoolchild knows, this com-
mitment was enshrined in the plain text of the First Amendment, text 
which continues to this day to provide robust protection for speech 
rights. 
This story, unfortunately, fits poorly with actual legal history. For 
despite all the rhetoric in First Amendment cases about the Founders' 
intentions, contemporary free speech doctrine is thoroughly modern. 
Not until the 1930s did the courts begin to recognize anytbing close to 
a prohibition on censorship. To the contrary, throughout the first 150 
years of the First Amendment, federal courts regularly enforced severe 
restrictions on citizens' ability to speak freely. 
To explain this anomaly, academic commentators have constructed 
a second version of the familiar history. This account, which is the one 
taught to first-year constitutional law students and propounded by 
nearly all scholars and casebooks, portrays a First Amendment tradition 
marked by slow and steady progress. The orthodox academic history 
begins with the censorship of the World War I seditious libel cases3 and 
1. When I refer in this article to "the First Amendment," I mean only the speech 
and press clauses. Although my argument has implications for the religion and assem-
bly c!auses, I do not claim to have treated them thoroughly here. 
2. The phrase is Professor Ely's. SeeJohn H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A The-
ory of Judicial Review 12 (1980). 
3. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919). 
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moves through the Holmes and Brandeis minority opInIOns in the 
1920s4 up to the present apex of speech protections.5 
Simply juxtaposing these two familiar histories suggests that some-
thing is amiss. Either the level of speech protection has been consist-
ently high, or there has been a gradual upward climb. Either the grade 
school version or the law school version must be mistaken. Or, as this 
Article will argue, both are mistaken. The history of the First Amend-
ment reveals neither an identity between the Founders' aspirations and 
contemporary achievements, nor a steady trajectory from darkness to 
enlightenment. While today's First Amendment stands for something 
very different from what the Founders envisioned, the change was pro-
duced not by an increasing societal belief in the value of free speech, 
but by two watershed transformations in American government-the 
Civil War and the New Deal-that remade the entire constitutional 
framework. 
Ever since its enactment, the Bill of Rights, and in particular the 
First Amendment, have embodied a constitutional commitment to lib-
erty-an undertaking to protect the people against tyranny. This fun-
damental purpose has remained invariant since 1791. The nature of 
the threat to liberty, however, has changed over time. This threat 
comes from the governmental institutions created by the Constitution 
itself. As the powers of these institutions have changed, so too has the 
nature of their hazards, and so has the protection demanded of the 
First Amendment. While the dangers presented by the original consti-
tutional scheme no longer seem urgent, the modem governmental 
structure involves new perils, against which the Founders' safeguards 
4. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
5. See, e.g., Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (overturning flag desecration 
statute); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (subversive advocacy is pro-
tected "except where [it] is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing "actual malice" test for libel of public figure). 
For a clear and thorough exposition of the orthodox history, see Harry Kalven, Jr., 
A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America (1988); see also Thomas I. Emer-
son, The System of Freedom of Expression 63-64 (1970) (Espionage Act cases "began 
the remarkable development of First Amendment doctrine which has continued to the 
present day"); Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 188 (1989) 
("Substantial Supreme Court development of First Amendment doctrine began with re-
view of convictions under the 1917 Espionage Act .... "); Floyd Abrams, A Worthy 
Tradition: The Scholar and the First Amendment, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1162, 1163 (1990) 
(book review) (calling Kalven's book "the single indispensable study of the development 
of first amendment law"). Casebooks, too, invariably begin their First Amendment story 
in 1917, and tell of an unwavering climb toward enlightenment. See, e.g., Gerald Gun-
ther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law 651 (4th ed. 1986) ("The Court's first sig-
nificant encounter with the problem of articulating the scope of constitutionally 
protected expression came in a series of cases involving agitation against the war and the 
draft during World War I."); Paul A. Freund et al., Constitutional Law: Cases and Other 
Problems 1130-1344 (4th ed. 1977). 
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are inadequate. The specific content of the First Amendment-its 
method for combatting tyranny-has changed accordingly. Each of the 
three eras of American constitutionalism-from the founding to the 
Civil War, from the Civil War to the New Deal, and from the New Deal 
through the present-has seen its own particular incarnation of the 
First Amendment effort to ensure liberty. 
In tracing these eras, this Article will treat free speech doctrine 
within each time period, including the contemporary era, as more or 
less monolithic. For the purposes of this Article, differences among the 
competing First Amendment theories put forward by scholars-theo-
ries grounded in self-governance,6 individual autonomy,7 or the "free 
trade in ideas"8-are minor. The fundamental precepts of contempo-
rary free speech doctrine, including an absolutist hostility to govern-
ment regulation of public-directed speech, are common ground. This 
Article will not attempt, then, to argue that one or another of the pre-
vailing academic approaches to the First Amendment is in some sense 
best. Instead, the effort will be to offer a fresh history of the First 
Amendment, one that relates free speech doctrine to broader constitu-
tional structures. 
Part I will begin the story with the Founders' understanding of the 
structural role of the First Amendment. In this understanding, the First 
Amendment served as a bulwark of state independence. Along with the 
rest of the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment had as its primary pur-
pose maintenance of the federal system-or, more precisely, protection 
of the states against federal government overreaching. The Founders' 
plan left the individual states entirely free to regulate speech, while 
strictly prohibiting the federal government from displacing the states' 
various speech regimes. 
When the Civil War dram'\tically reshaped the federal-state rela-
tionship, the strnctural purpose of the Bill of Rights changed in re-
sponse. Part II will describe this change. No longer were the 
Constitution's protections of individual rights aimed exclusively at the 
national government. Indeed, over the seventy years following the 
Civil War, imposing restrictions on state governments became a central 
constitutional concern. But this concern found expression not through 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment but through the prop-
erty-focused guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
6. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 5; Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Rela-
tion to Self-Government (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Ab-
solute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245. 
7. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 5;]ohn Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1989); David 
AJ. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974). 
8. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting), 
See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 
(1982) (discussing and critiquing "marketplace of ideas" theory). 
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Free speech was relegated to the periphery. This period, from the Civil' 
War to the New Deal, was the nadir of the First Amendment. 
Part III will show how the New Deal brought free speech to the 
center of constitutional jurisprudence. This shift, too, was the product 
of a broad-gauged reconfiguration. The legitimation of activist govern-
ment rendered previous constitutional understandings unworkable. 
No longer could liberty be guaranteed-as in the Federalist era-by 
protecting the independent authority of the states, or-as in the Civil 
War era-by preserving common law rights to property and contract. 
Instead, the Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional guaran-
tee of liberty as protecting the processes of democracy and electoral 
accountability. In the New Deal era, the Court has extended to political 
affairs the libertarianism it earlier applied to economic affairs: The 
First Amendment prohibits the government from rearranging private 
distributions of political resources. The impetus for this interpretation 
comes from the highly undemocratic and unaccountable nature of the 
administrative state. Because the New Deal era government is so pow-
erful, the liberty principle embedded in the First Amendment requires 
the Court to ensure the state's subjection to popular control. 
Having identified the three eras of free speech jurisprudence in 
Parts I, II, and III, Part IV will elaborate the scholarly method and the 
premises about constitutional theory that underlie this recounting. 
This method is holistic, structural, and historical. It understands each 
constitutional component in relation to other provisions; it focuses on 
the concrete institutional endowments effected by constitutional 
lawmakers rather than the general principles those lawmakers arguably 
endorsed; and it is sensitive to the development of constitutional struc-
ture over time. Part IV will conclude by examining the normative im-
plications of the history of the First Amendment. Contemporary free 
speech doctrine suffers from many of the same defects that eventually 
forced the abandonment of earlier eras' liberty jurisprudence. Under-
standing the origins of the modem orthodoxy will suggest directions 
for future ~hange. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE FEDERALIST FRAMEWORK 
In his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis 
wrote: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end 
of the State was to make men free to develop their facul-
ties .... They believed that freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means "indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth. . . . Believing in the power of 
reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed si-
lence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. 
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, 
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assem-
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bly should b~ guaranteed. g' 
Well, not exactly: The Whitney concurrence contains some of Brandeis' 
most stirring rhetoric, and it eventually ~as adopted by a majority of 
the Court. It accurately captures the liberal commitment to tolerance 
shared by many, probably most, of the individuals who participated in 
the Founding. But Brandeis slips when he suggests that the Constitu-
tion aimed at stamping out censorship. The First Amendment, like the 
rest of the Bill of Rights, did not originally apply to the states. The 
"guarantee" it effected was therefore quite weak-at least to contempo-
rary eyes. A citizen in 1800 had no absolute right to free speech; if the 
speech-restricting law was a state law, the Constitution was silent. 
On the other hand, if Brandeis attributed too much to the Foun-
ders' intentions for the First Amendment, Robert Bork attributed too 
little when he wrote: "The Framers seem to have had no coherent the-
ory of free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned with 
the subject. ... The First Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, 
appears to have been a hastily drafted document upon which little 
thought was expended."lo The original First Amendment was by no 
means the equivalent of today's blanket prohibition on speech regula-
tion, but neither was it a trivial afterthought, intended to have little or 
no practical effect. 
Looking at the First Amendment in isolation has limited scholars 
and judges to these two alternatives, despite the obvious shortcomings 
of each. The First Amendment did aim at ensuring liberty to the citi-
zens of the new republic, but not by eradicating all censorship. Rather, 
the framers of the First Amendment sought to guarantee liberty by 
maintaining the independence of the states. To this end, the Amend-
ment prohibited the central government from interfering in the polit-
ical life of the states, while leaving state governments free to regulate 
speech. 
A. The Origin oj the First Amendment as a States' Rights Protection 
The ratification debates clearly articulated the Founders' view of 
the Bill of Rights as a protection against the centralization of power. I I 
The Federalist supporters of the Constitution asserted that the Bill was 
superfluous. To the Federalists, Article I, Section 8's enumeration of 
9. 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
10. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
Inda LJ. 1, 22 (1971). ., 
11. In speaking of "the Founders' view," I do not mean to claim that the individuals 
who participated in drafting and ratifying the Constitution shared a uniform set of be-
liefs and values. I do contend, however, that I can meaningfuIly characterize the inten-
tions and ideals embodied by the Constitution, and can attribute these intentions and 
ideals to "the Founders." Indeed, I believe that such characterization is indispensable 
to interpretation of the Constitution, or of any law. 
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the permissible areas of federal legislation was ,a sufficiently powerful 
check on the central government. I2 The federal government would 
have no power to legislate beyond what was specifically delegated to it 
in the Constitution. Indeed, Hamilton wrote that he would 
go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to 
the extent in which they are contended for, are not only un-
necessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be 
dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers 
which are not granted; and, on this very account, would afford 
a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why 
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power 
to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of 
the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by 
which restrictions may be imposed?I3 
The Anti-Federalists were not satisfied. Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island included proposals for bills of 
rights as part of the resolutions they passed ratifying the Constitu-
tion.I4 In the crucial New York convention, the Anti-Federalists nearly 
succeeded in conditioning ratification on the calling of a national con-
vention to propose amendments. At the last minute, by a vote of 31-
29, the delegates agreed to substitute "in full confidence" for "on con-
dition" in the resolution of ratification.I5 The Federalists secured legal 
ratification, but, as the political price, they agreed to add to the Consti-
tution a set of explicit prohibitions on federal government power. The 
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to incorporate these Anti-Federalist 
protections into the predominantly Federalist document. 
The last thing the Anti-Federalist proponents of the Bill wanted 
12. See, e.g., 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution 540 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1866) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates] 
(statement of Thomas M'Kean); id. at 435-38 (statements of James Wilson). 
13. The Federalist No. 84, at 513-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
Madison's version of this 'argument (during the ratification process, at least-his 
views later changed) was that a bill of rights would simply be useless: "[A] mere demar-
cation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a suffi-
cient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all 
the powers of government in the same hands." The Federalist No. 48, at 313 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He believed that only the constitutional struc-
tures of separated and divided powers could prevent goverumental overreaching and 
ensure individual liberty. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). The Founders' 
ideological transformation from a belief in bills of rights-a belief enshrined in the Dec-
laration of Independence-to a reliance on structural solutions is recounted in Gordon 
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 430-564 (1969). 
14. See 1 Elliot's Debates, supra note 12, at 322-27,337. South Carolina also pro-
posed modifications, although not a comprehensive bill of rights. See 1 id. at 325. 
Virginia listed a set of rights which it declared was implicit in the Constitution. See 1 id. 
at 327. In 1788, North Carolina declined to ratify, calling for a bill of rights to be added 
before it would consent. See 1 id. at 331-32. 
15. See 2 id. at 412. 
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was to empower the federal courts to invalidate state legislation. Their 
concern was just the opposite: maintaining the authority of the states 
in the face of the new, dangerously powerful national government. No 
one among the Founders thought that the Bill of Rights would limit the 
states. 
This understanding was wholeheartedly accepted by the jUdiciary. 
In 1845, the Supreme Court in Pennoli v. Municipality No. 1 16 addressed 
the scope of state authority under the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment. The New Orleans statute at issue in Pennoli made it un-
lawful to bring a corpse into a Catholic church; the municipality sought 
to funnel funerals into a state-established "obituary church." A Catho-
lic priest convicted of violating the statute appealed to the Supreme 
Court, invoking the protection of the First Amendment. The Court 
made short shrift of his claim: "The Constitution makes no provision 
for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious lib-
erties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor is there any 
inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this re-
spect on the states."17 This analysis applied to freedom of expression 
as well. 
The states made (il)liberal use of their authority. Legal historians 
Leonard Levy18 and Norman Rosenberg19 have uncovered a history of 
vigorous and repeated acts of censorship by state governments-what 
Levy termed a "legacy of suppression." Throughout the early 19th 
century, states used criminal libel statutes to imprison critics of the gov-
ernment.20 Just as stifling to dissent, incumbent politicians regularly 
recovered sizable verdicts in civil libel cases against publishers and op-
ponents who had disparaged their performance in office.21 Because 
this regime of censorship was implem<;nted at the state level, rather 
than under congressional authority, it went unimpeded by the First 
Amendment. 
B. The Founders' Theory of the First Amendment 
To the people who drafted and enacted the First Amendment, its 
silence with respect to state restrictions on speech was no anomaly, no 
gap in the armor of constitutional protection. The Founders believed it 
entirely appropriate, even desirable, for the states to regulate speech. 
16. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). 
17. Id. at 609. 
18. See Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in 
Early American History (1960) [hereinafter Legacy]. Levy later modified his views 
somewhat, see Leonard W. Levy, Emergence ofa Free Press (1985), but his factual find-
ings and essential interpretive conclusions have remained unchanged. 
19. See Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History 
of the Law of Libel (1986). 
20. See id. at 108-20; Levy, Legacy, supra note 18, at 204-12. 
21. See Rosenberg, supra note 19 at 120-28. 
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When Levy published Legacy of Suppression in 1960, its argument that the 
Founders accepted a great deal of government censorship was dramatic 
revisionism; it is now orthodoxy.22 While there has been a protracted 
debate over the nuances of Levy's position, his basic conclusions are 
uncontroversial: The Founders' conception of free speech libertarian-
ism was vastly different from contemporary versions. 
In the first place, the Founders did not conceive of liberty as re-
quiring that all points of view have access to public debate. Large cate-
gories of immoderate public speech were, in their view, properly 
subject to censure. Recent scholarship by Professor Rosenberg has 
buttressed Levy's findings: 
[T]o political leaders of Jefferson's generation constitutional 
guarantees did not require toleration of everything published 
in the press about the conduct of the best men. Ratber, polit-
icalleaders from both m.yor factions endorsed a quite differ-
ent proposition: government, if not at the national then at the 
state level, had a positive responsibility to monitor-and, 
when necessary, to step in and moderate-political 
communication.23 
The Founders did not believe that liberty depended upon the inclusion 
in public debate of all possible points of view. 24 Just as important, the 
22. Levy argued that the Founders considered only prior restraints on speech to 
violate the First Amendment; they saw post-publication punishment as permissible. See 
Levy, Legacy, supra note 18, at 186. The leading exponent of the then-mainstream view 
attacked by Levy was Zechariah Chafee. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the 
United States (2d ed. 1942). 
23. Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 100. 
24. 1 do not want to give the impression that the Founders had no theory of free-
dom of speech, or that they were unconcerned to protect this freedom. To the contrary, 
of the 13 state constitutions adopted during the revolutionary period, ten contained 
explicit protections for speech or the press. See 1 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary 
History 235 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1971) (reprinting Virginia Declaration of Rights en-
acted in 1776); id. at 256-61 (reprinting New Jersey Constitution enacted in 1776) (no 
speech protection); id. at 266 (reprinting Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights enacted in 
1776); id. at 284 (reprinting Maryland Declaration of Rights enacted in 1776); id. at 287 
(reprinting North Carolina Declaration of Rights enacted in 1776); id. at 289-90 (re-
printing Connecticut Declaration of Right enacted in 1776) (no speech protection); id. 
at 300 (reprinting Georgia Constitution enacted in 1777); id. at 301-13 (reprinting New 
York Constitution enacted in 1777) (no speech protection); id. at 324 (reprinting Ver-
mont Declaration of Rights enacted in 1777); id. at 335 (reprinting South Carolina Con-
stitution enacted in 1778); id. at 342 (reprinting Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
enacted in 1780); id. at 378 (reprinting New Hampshire Bill of Rights enacted in 1783). 
I do, however, want to emphasize two points. First, the Founders' conception of 
free speech was very different from the versions espoused by present-day courts and 
commentators. As Levy and Rosenberg have demonstrated, the Founders counte-
nanced a far greater degree of government censorship than does the current orthodox 
approach. Their theory was rooted in the common law privacy torts; the significance of 
this fact is developed infra at text accompanying notes 80-119. 
Second, the state constitutional protections varied in scope, from Maryland's simple 
declaration "[t]hat the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved," id. at 284, 
to Pennsylvania's broader guarantee "[t]hat the people have a right to freedom of 
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Founders maintained that each state had to determine for itself how 
much speech to permit. Speech was one of the many areas of public life 
deliberately left by the Constitution to the regulatory discretion of the 
states. This allocation of power was deeply rooted in the Federalist 
theory of liberty. 
Because the states were less extensive than the entire republic and 
closer to the people than the federal government, the Founders be-
lieved that the states were more easily held accountable to the citizenry. 
Time and again in the debates in the states over ratification, both Fed-
eralists and Anti-Federalists expressed their assumption that the peo-
ple's liberties were safer with the states than with a central government. 
In the New York convention, for example, John Lansing noted: 
It has been observed, that, as the people must, of necessity, 
delegate essential powers either to the individual or general 
sovereignties, it is perfectly immaterial where they are lodged; 
but, as the state governments will always possess a better rep-
resentation of the feelings and interests of the people at large, 
it is obvious that those powers can be deposited with much 
greater safety with the state than the general government.25 
The classic judicial statement of this view isJustice Marshall's opin-
ion in Barron v. Baltimore. 26 The plaintiff in Barron sought to apply the 
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against uncompensated takings to the 
City of Baltimore. Marshall dispatched this claim by noting that the 
Constitution left the relationships between the individual states and 
their citizens untouched. If the people had a quarrel with their state 
governments, that was a matter between the states and their citizens; 
the federal government-and the federal Constitution-had nothing to 
do with it: 
Had the people of the several states, or any of them, required 
changes in their constitutions; had they required additional 
safeguards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of 
their particular governments: the remedy was in their own 
hands, and would have been applied by themselves. A con-
vention would have been assembled by the discontented state, 
and the required improvements would have been made by 
itself.27 
Marshall went further. Recalling the ratification debates, he located the 
speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments: therefore the freedom of the 
press ought not to be restrained." This variation was precisely what the Constitution 
was designed to protect. The Founders wanted the states, not the federal government, 
to retain authority over speech regulation. In fact, two of the states that called for a 
federal Bill of Rights-New York and Delaware--did not have speech protections in 
their own state charters. 
25. 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 12, at 217. 
26. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-51 (1833). 
27. Id. at 249-50 (plurality opinion). 
1991] FIRST AMENDMENT ERAS 1709 
rationale behind this constitutional policy in the different attitudes the 
Founders held toward the state and federal governments: 
[1]t is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the 
day, that the great revolution which established the constitu-
tion of the United States, was not effected without immense 
opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that 
those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched 
over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, 
and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which 
union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous 
to liberty. In almost every convention by which the constitu-
tion was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of 
power were recommended. These amendments demanded se-
curity against the apprehended encroachments of the general 
government-not against those of the local governments. 
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, 
to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were 
proposed by the required majority in congress, and adopted 
by the states. These amendments contain no expression indi-
cating an intention to apply them to the state governments. 
This court cannot so apply them.28 
In framing the Constitution, the Founders left most governmental au-
thority in the states. "I:hey relied on the popular character of the states 
to protect fundamental rights. This reliance was a central component 
of the Founders' vision of liberty. 
Not only did the Constitution omit restrictions on states, but it ac-
tively depended for its success on the vigor and independence of state 
governments. The Founders were crucially concerned with the prob-
lem of majority tyranny-what Madison called "the violence of fac-
tion."29 They feared that one faction would capture the central 
government and use its control of the governmental machinery to wipe 
out and oppress its rivals. Madison's famous solution, implemented by 
the Constitution, was to "extend the sphere" of governance-to bring 
the full play of contending societal forces into a forum where the fac-
tions would cancel each other out.so 
The state governments were to play an integral role in this process. 
They were built-in factions. In an age before the emergence of modem 
political parties, the state governments were ready-made political orga-
nizations, continually prepared to challenge oppression by the federal 
government. The Founders envisioned that if the central government 
should ever attempt to overstep its boundaries, the states would mobil-
ize popular opposition to the Congress and the President: 
[A]mbitious encroachments of the federal government on the 
authority of the State governments would not excite the oppo-
28. Id. at 250 (plurality opinion). 
29. The Federalist No. 10, at 77 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
30. Id. at 83. 
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sition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be 
signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse 
the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. 
Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would ani-
mate and conduct the whole.31 
The Founders had seen precisely that happen in the Revolution, and 
they sought in the Constitution to provide for the states to continue to 
play a checking-and-balancing role. This role was institutionalized in 
national elections by authorizing state legislatures to elect Senators and 
to appoint presidential electors. In extreme circumstances, Article V 
empowered the states by themselves to initiate changes in the federal 
Constitution. Both the normal electoral mechanism and the extraordi-
nary amendment device had as a prerequisite the states' control over 
their own internal political processes. Maintaining this control was the 
overriding objective of the First Amendment. 
Seen from the Founders' viewpoint, the Bill of Rights, including 
the First Amendment, was a set of structural protections for the federal 
system. The Founders' intention for the First Amendment, if there is 
such a thing, was not to eradicate censorship. It was to limit central 
government intrusion into the states' prerogatives. Proponents of the 
Bill of Rights saw it as a guarantee of liberty not because it listed unin-
fringeable rights but because it set out areas that were left entirely to 
the states' discretion. 
C. The First Amendment in Practice 
The Founders' theory was elaborated in the constitutional practice 
of the next half-century. Two political battles during this period raised 
important First Amendment issues. In both of these episodes, the 
Amendment played the role its framers had intended for it: a bulwark 
against centralization. 
1. The Sedition Act. - For a decade after ratification, proponents of 
the national government and supporters of states-now coalesced into 
the Federalist and Republican parties-clashed over the proper scope 
of federal government authority. The Federalist Washington and Ad-
ams administrations pursued a policy of strengthening the central gov-
ernment. They created the Bank of the United States and actively 
supported England in its war against France. The Republicans, led by 
Jefferson, bitterly opposed these efforts. 
Fearing the success of Republican challenges to their program, the 
Federalists enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1797 and 1798. 
These laws, the Sedition Act in particular, baldly exceeded constitu-
tionallimits on federal lawmaking authority. The Act provided 
[t]hat if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall 
cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, 
31. The Federalist No. 46, at 298 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, print-
ing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious 
writing or writings against the government of the United 
States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or 
the President of the United States, with intent to defame the 
said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the 
said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into con-
tempt or disrepute; ... then such person ... shall be punished 
by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprison-
ment not exceeding two years.32 
Just as the Anti-Federalists had feared, a national government bent 
on consolidating power sought to use censorship to short-circuit polit-
ical checks on its expansionist ambitions. The Federalists indicted 
fourteen people under the Sedition Act in federal courts, and obtained 
ten convictions.33 Every one of these cases was a political prosecution. 
None involved the sort of personal slander today thought of as libel. 
The first victim was Representative Matthew Lyon, a Republican from 
Vermont.34 Lyon was convicted on the basis of two letters to the edi-
tors of newspapers published during his 1798 campaign for Congress. 
The letters attacked Adams' "continual grasp for power" and his "un-
bounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish ava-
rice."35 Other prosecutions aimed at silencing prominent Jeffersonian 
newspapers. James Callender, an editor of the Richmond Examiner, the 
leading Republican paper in the South, was convicted for accusing 
Adams of pushing the country toward a war with France.36 The 
Supreme Court, in an act of cowardice spurred, perhaps, by its institu-
tional insecurity (Marbury being five years in the future), refused to hear 
argnment on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act; indeed, every 
Justice on the all-Federalist Court expressed approval of the Act in 
opinions delivered on circuit.37 
32. An Act in addition to the act, entitled "An act for the punishment of certain 
crimes against the United States," ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97 (1798). 
33. See James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and 
American Civil Liberties 185-86 (1956). The Federalists also initiated a number of Se-
dition Act prosecutions in state courts. . 
34. Lyon's case was apparently not reported in the Federal Cases, although it was 
tried in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Vermont District. The case is documented in 
Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States During the Administrations of 
Washington and Adams (Burt Franklin ed., 1970); see also Smith, supra note 33, at 
221-46 (detailing the Federalist attack on Lyon). 
35. Wharton, supra note 34, at 333 (quoting Lyon's indictment). 
36. See United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709); 
see also Smith, supra note 33, at 334-58 (providing a detailed history of Callender's 
indictment and conviction). The indictment of Luther Baldwin evidences the despera-
tion with which the Federalists enforced the Sedition Act. Baldwin was indicted and 
fined $150 for remarking, when a cannon fired shortly after President Adams had passed 
it, that the country would have been well served had some of the shot lodged in Adams's 
buttock. See id. at 270-71. 
37. See, e.g., Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 256-58 (opinion ofChase,J.); In re Fries, 9 F. 
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The Supreme Court's failure notwithstanding, the federal system 
worked as the Founders had anticipated. The Sedition Act was met 
quickly by the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. The Republican-
controlled Kentucky legislature, in a resolution drafted by Thomas jef-
ferson, declared that the Act, "which does abridge the freedom of the 
press, is not law, but is altogether void, and of no force."88 Virginia 
enacted a similar denunciation-authored, along with an accompanying 
"Report on the Virginia Resolutions," by james Madison. Madison's 
agonized, even disbelieving, "Report" established the Sedition Act's 
plain unconstitutionality by thoroughly examining the debates sur-
rounding ratification of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights: "It is 
painful to remark how much the arguments now employed in behalf of 
the Sedition Act, are at variance with the reasoning which thenjustified 
the Constitution, and invited its ratification."89 
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions served as an organizing fo-
cus for the Republican opposition. On the strength of popular resist-
ance to the Federalists' nationalization of power, and in particular to 
the Alien and Sedition Acts,jefferson unseated Adams in the 1800 elec-
tion. The Republican victory, however, was a triumph not for free 
speech libertarianism but for states' rights. Republicans never repudi-
ated the crime of seditious libe1.40 They only insisted that the power to 
punish libelers was restricted to the states. As a leading Republican, 
Representative Edward Livingston of New York, stated in arguing 
against enactment of the Sedition Act by the House: "There is a rem-
edy for offenses of this kind in the laws of every State in the Union. 
Every man's character is protected by law, and every man who shall 
publish a libel on any part of the Government, is liable to punish-
ment."41 Once in power, the Republicans abandoned the Federalists' 
centralization program, and they let the Sedition Act expire rather than 
turning it against their Federalist opponents. But state law seditious 
libel prosecutions-by Republican state governments--continued.42 
These events neatly illustrate the role of the First Amendment not 
Cas. 826, 836-41 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5126) (opinion of Iredell,j.); Smith, supra 
note 33, at 271 (opinions of Cushing and Washington, lJ., in Luther Baldwin's case); 
Wharton, supra note 34, at 336 (opinion ofPaterson,j., in Lyon's case). In fact,justice 
Chase's overly enthusiastic supervision of Sedition Act prosecutions led, in part, to his 
impeachment by the Republicans once they gained office. 
38. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 12, at 541. 
39. Id. at 572. 
40. See Levy, Legacy, supra note 18, at 307-08. Professor Walter Berns, while crit-
icizing Levy, has reached a conclusion similar to my own. See Walter Berns, Freedom of 
the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109, 
110-11 ("The principle on which ... Republican leaders based their opposition was not 
'a broad libertarian' version of civil liberties but the doctrine of states' rights, or nullifi-
cation, or disunion."); see also id. at 121, 126, 129 (arguing that the Republican's attack 
on the Alien and Sedition Acts was rooted in their desire to protect states' rights). 
41. Levy, Legacy, supra note 18, at 264. 
42. See id. at 297-307; Berns, supra note 40, at 150-53. 
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as a guarantee of personal· freedom nor even as a protection of demo-
cratic processes, but as a provision specifically aimed at safeguarding 
the federal system. It was no coincidence that the first threat to the 
First Amendment-and to the political process the Founders had estab-
lished-came from the same Administration that also threatened the 
federal-state balance the Founders had put in place. The core First 
Amendment concern was centralization. The Founders believed that 
they could ensure individual liberty by limiting the federal govern-
ment's power, leaving as the domain of the states all but the categories 
of federal authority specifically enumerated in the Constitution. They 
counted on the states to maintain this allocation-to combat centraliza-
tion-through the political process. The Framers of the Bill of Rights 
well understood that the states' ability to perform this role depended 
crucially upon First Amendment protection from federal government 
censorship. 
2. The Debate over Abolition Literature. - The constitutional crisis of 
1798-1800 established for good the importance to the federal system 
of the First Amendment prohibition against national government regu-
lation of speech. The second major free speech controversy involved 
the issue at the heart of federal-state conflict: slavery. From about 
1830 through the Civil War, Southerners sought, at both the federal 
and state levels, to prohibit abolitionist literature. The debates sur-
rounding these efforts confirmed the First Amendment consensus left 
in place by the Sedition Act affair: States could censor what they 
wished, but the federal government was forbidden to meddle in the 
flow of speech. 
Beginning in the 1830s, southern concern over abolition literature 
reached a fever pitch. In the wake of the Nat Turner uprising, which 
the Governor of Virginia blamed in part on incitement by abolitionist 
newspapers, the pro-slavery forces strenuously attempted to eradicate 
the offending publications.43 Virginia and Tennessee enacted laws 
banning material "calculated to incite" rebellion among the slaves; the 
maximum punishment for a black offender under the Virginia statute 
was death.44 Most southern states already had broader, if less draco-
nian, statutes prohibiting abolitionist literature.45 
Despite these statutes, abolitionists in the North continued to flood 
the South with newspapers and pampblets. The legislatures of South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and 
43. See W. Sherman Savage, The Controversy over the Distribution of Abolition 
Literature 1830-1860, at 3 (1938). Useful studies of the debate over abolition papers 
are provided by Professor Savage's monograph and by Russel B. Nye, Fettered Free-
dom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860, at 32-69,94-196 (1949). 
An 1859 brouhaha centered on censorship of an anti-slavery book is reported in James 
M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 200 (1988). 
44. 1832 Va. Acts 20; accord 1836 Tenn. Pub. Acts 145. The Virginia prohibition 
was later broadened to include all material advocating abolition. See 1836 Va. Acts 44. 
45. See, e.g., 1802 N.C. Sess. Laws 200; 1820 S.C. Acts 22; 1804 Ga. Laws 5. 
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Kentucky called on their northern counterparts to enact censorship 
statutes.46 When these appeals failed, the Southerners sought to have 
the U.S. Postal Service cease delivery of abolitionist publications. After 
a mob in Charleston looted the local post office, the Postmaster Gen-
eral asked President Jackson for relief.47 In his December 1835 
message to Congress, Jackson proposed a bill to prohibit from the 
mails all discussion of slavery.48 
Considering the intensity of southern support for a ban, Jackson's 
proposal ought to have had an easy time in Congress. In 1835, most 
northern Senators were as antagonistic to abolitionists as they were to 
slavery; they sought accommodation with the South rather than con-
flict. Jackson's bill seemed assured of passage when John C. Calhoun, 
the leading champion of the southern cause, took charge of it in the 
Senate. Rather than sending the bill on its normal route through the 
Post Office Committee, Calhoun arranged to have it referred to an ad 
hoc Committee on Incendiary Papers chaired by himself and composed 
but for one member of Southerners.49 
Jackson'S proposal put the southern Senators, Calhoun in particu-
lar, in a difficult position. The proposal's injection of the federal gov-
ernment into the arena of slavery and speech directly contravened the 
South's commitment to principles of states' rights. Calhoun personi-
fied this commitment, not only as a politician-most notably in the 
1832 nullification crisis in which he contended that individual states 
possessed the authority to nullify federal laws they deemed unconstitu-
tional-but as a constitutional theorist as well. His A Disquisition on Gov-
ernment and A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United 
States remain the most sophisticated version of the states' rights view of 
the Constitution ever offered.50 jackson's proposal, by permitting fed-
eral government censorship, would have rescinded one of the crucial 
constitutional protections of state independence, the First Amendment. 
After a considerable delay, the ad hoc Committee issued a lengthy re-
46. See Nye, supra note 43, at 109-15; Savage, supra note 43, at 43-49. 
47. See Savage, supra note 43, at 15-24 (describing Charleston uprising); Nye, 
supra note 43, at 56-57 (same); see also 5 Correspondence of Andrew Jackson 360-61 
Uohn Spencer Bassett ed., 1931) Uackson's reply to the Postmaster General). 
48. See 12 Register of Debates in Congress, Comprising the Leading Debates and 
Incidents of the First Session of the Twenty-Fourth Congress: Together With an Ap-
pendix, Containing Important State Papers and Public Documents, and the Laws, of a 
Public Nature, Enacted During the Session: With a Copious Index to the Whole pt. 4, 
app. 11 Uoseph Gales & William W. Seaton eds., 1836) [hereinafter Register of De-
bates]. Jackson's message was reprinted in Seventh Annual Message, 3 A Compilation 
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1394-95 Uames D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
49. See Congo Globe, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1835). 
50. See John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and A Discourse on the 
Constitution and Government of the United States, in 1 The Works of John C. Calhoun 
1, 168-81 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851) (Calhoun's theory that Constitution requires 
assent of "concurrent majorities"-i.e., majority of national population and majority of 
intra-state populations-to governmental initiatives). 
1991] FIRST AMENDMENT ERAS 1715 
port, authored primarily by Calhoun himself, rejecting Jackson's bill 
and suggesting an alternative.51 
The report began by affirming the southern states' right to main-
tain slavery, and by condemning the abolitionists' "evil and highly dan-
gerous" efforts to interfere with that right.52 But, Calhoun asserted, 
dealing with the abolitionists is ajob for the states, not the federal gov-
ernment. Calhoun recounted the history of ratification and the subse-
quent controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts, concluding that the 
principles underlying the First Amendment were too important to be 
dispensed with. jackson's proposal, he argued, was "a violation of one 
of the most sacred provisions of the constitution, and subversive of re-
served powers essential to the preservation of the domestic institutions 
of the slave-holding States, and, with them, their peace and security."53 
To Calhoun, even the worthy goal of shutting down the abolitionist 
press could not justify an abrogation of federalist guarantees: 
It would indeed have been but a poor triumph for the cause of 
liberty, in the great contest of 1799, had the sedition law been 
put down on principles that would have left Congress free to 
suppress the circulation, through the mail, of the very publica-
tions which that odious act was intended to prohibit. The au-
thors of that memorable achievement would have had but 
slender claims on the gratitude of posterity, if their victory 
over the encroachment of power had been left so imperfect.54 
Rather than abandoning the anti-abolition agenda completely, how-
ever, Calhoun sought to craft a proposal that would conform with his 
states' rights understanding of the Constitution. To this end, he put 
forth an alternative to the Jackson bill. Instead of banning abolition 
literature directly, Calhoun's version would have outlawed the delivery 
of mail that conflicted with the law of the recipient state.55 
Calhoun's proposal met opposition from both sides. In fact, on 
the very day the Committee report was released, three of the Commit-
tee's six members expressed disapproval of the report on the Senate 
floor.56 The Southerners' complaint was with Calhoun's conclusion 
that an outright ban on abolition literature was unconstitutional.57 The 
more serious opposition came from Northerners, who refused to be-
lieve that Calhoun had remedied the constitutional defects of the ear-
lier proposal. The Northerners, led by John Davis and Daniel Webster 
of Massachusetts, contended that any selection by Congress of what 
51. See 12 Register of Debates, supra note 48, at pt. 4, app. 72-77. Senators're-
marks concerning the report, although not the text of the report itself, are reprinted in 
Congo Globe, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-51 (1836). 
52. 12 Register of Debates, supra note 48, at pt. 4, app. 72. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 73. 
55. See Congo Globe, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1836). 
56. See id. at 150-51 (statements of Sens. King, Davis, and Linn). 
57. See, e.g., id. at 347 (statement of Sen. King). 
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could and could not be mailed violated the First Amendment. 
Whatever the formula for determining acceptability, they argued, 
Calhoun's bill made the federal government the agent of censorship.58 
Calhoun's response was to insist that his bill vindicated the federal-
ism principles underlying the Bill of Rights. Nothing could be more 
consistent with the First Amendment, he reasoned, than to leave to 
state law the determination of what speech to allow. Ifhis bill called for 
federal government intervention, it was only in order to effectuate the 
individual state preferences envisioned, even mandated, by the 
Constitution. 59 
As the debate progressed, the Northerners' objections proved per-
suasive. The Senate rejected Calhoun's bill 25 to 19, ending the south-
ern push for federal government intervention. With the Senate evenly 
divided between North and South, the balance of defeat was provided 
by the six Senators from border slave states, all of whom-including 
Henry Clay-voted against the bill.60 Missouri's Thomas Benton is ex-
emplary. Though a loyal Jacksonian, Benton's ardent states' rights con-
victions led him to oppose both the President's proposal and Calhoun's 
alternative. Benton's remarks on the Calhoun bill, reported in the Con-
gressional Globe, expressed the view of the swing contingent: 
Mr. Benton was not willing that the United States should be 
made a pack horse for the abolitionists; but it seemed to him 
to be going too far to invest ten thousand postmasters (for he 
believed that was about the number), with the authority vested 
in them by this bill, and he could not vote for it.61 
Because the debate in Congress over abolitionist literature did not 
result in legislation, it led to no judicial statement of First Amendment 
doctrine. Nonetheless, the episode demonstrates the prevailing consti-
tutional consensus in the period between the Founding and the Civil 
War. Constitutional concerns may not have been the decisive factor in 
the minds of the Northerners who opposed Calhoun's bill, but these 
Senators-as well, perhaps, as some among those who supported the 
bill-undoubtedly saw the proposal as a violation of the First Amend-
ment. Even Calhoun, through his rejection of Jackson'S straightfor-
ward censorship proposal, showed himself to appreciate the 
importance of First Amendment restrictions on national power 
(although his alternative was a dubious improvement). 
From the Founding to the Civil War, the purpose and effect of the 
58. See id. at 288-89, 299 (statements of Sen. Davis); id. at app. 453 (statement of 
Sen. Webster). 
59. See id. at 298, 302 (statements of Sen. Calhoun). 
60. See id. at 539. By "border slave states," I mean Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, 
and Missouri-slave states that did not secede. Because one seat in both Missouri and 
Delaware either was vacant or abstained, these four states produced only six votes on 
the bilI. 
6 I. Id. at 30 I (statement of Sen. Benton). 
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First Amendment was to leave regulation of speech to the states. This 
particular concern with the power of the central government reflected 
the larger theory of the Founders. In the original constitutional vision, 
liberty was tied to the independence of the states. This theory was em-
bedded in the constitutional structure. The separation of powers, the 
enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8, and the Bill of Rights all 
aimed at checking the federal government, thereby ensuring that states 
would remain the primary loci of lawmaking authority. The First 
Amendment was a central component of the federal structure. It pro-
tected not only the rights of individual citizens, but also the preroga-
tives of the states, and, most important, the vitality of the state-based 
political process. 
II. THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS 
The Civil War marked a new phase in the development of free 
speech jurisprudence, as it did in constitutional law generally. The key 
innovation of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
was to introduce constitutional limitations on state governments. The 
Founders' solution to the problem of tyranny had been to limit the cen-
tral government. They had placed their trust in the states. This solu-
tion, of course, presented its own problems. In the period leading to 
the Civil War, the nation had come to see that the states, too, could 
imperil the most fundamental individual liberties. To counter this 
newly perceived threat, the Supreme Court developed for the first time 
constitutional limits on state government authority. Under the rubric of 
substantive due process, a set of judicially articulated norms became 
the primary constitutional guarantee of individual liberty.62 These 
norms, however, drew heavily upon the pre-existing state-centered 
constitutional structure. Post-Civil War substantive due process doc-
trine derived almost entirely from common law precepts. While the 
states as institutions of popular government were no longer the reposi-
tories of constitutional trust, the state-court created common law as-
sumed the burden of guarding against governmental tyranny. 
A. The Nadir of Free Speech 
The Court's emerging jurisprudence of liberty rights ignored First 
Amendment values. From the Founding to the Civil War, citizens' 
rights to free speech had been insecure, considering the states' un-
checked authority to censor. Mter the Civil War, there was no right at 
all to free speech. Censorship trials continued to be prominent fea-
62. Cf. Eric Foner, Reconstruction 258 (1988) (in drafting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, "Congress placed great reliance on an activist federal judiciary for civil rights 
enforcement-a mechanism that appeared preferable to maintaining indefinitely a 
standing anny in the South, or establishing a pennanent national bureaucracy empow-
ered to oversee Reconstruction"). 
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tures of the political process. Government prosecutors were able to 
convict-if not to silence-some of the most prominent reform politi-
cians. In 1891, for example, a Texas court convicted and fined William 
Lamb, one of the founders of the Populist Party, for libel.63 His crime 
was rnnning an advertisement criticizing a local politician in the news-
paper he published. In a pivotal development, censorship was no 
longer limited to the states. The federal government criminalized dis-
sent with equal, perhaps greater, vigor. In 1918, Eugene Debs was sen-
tenced by a federal judge to ten years injail for giving a speech against 
American involvement in World War 1. While serving his sentence-
which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Debs v. United States 64-Debs 
received nearly one million votes as the Socialist Party candidate in the 
'1920 presidential election.65 
This reign of censorship went unchallenged by the courts. Again 
and again, the Supreme Court rejected claimed First Amendment 
rights in favor of the government's power to regulate speech and pun-
ish dissenting speakers.66 Not until the 1930s did the Court begin to 
recognize a constitutional prohibition on censorship. 
The most well-known decisions of the post-Civil War, pre-New 
Deal period are Gitlow v. New York 67 and Whitney v. California.68 These 
cases are remembered primarily for the minority opinions written by 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, opinions which served as the foundation 
for the pro-speech jurisprudence that sprang up in the 1930s. The ma-
jority opinions in Gitlow and Whitney, however, upheld convictions 
under state criminal syndicalism statutes designed to prohibit the 
spread of socialist literature. And while most commentators and 
casebooks treat Gitlow and Whitney-the dissents, that is-as the begin-
ning of a tradition of tolerance that continues to the present,69 in fact 
the majority opinions are much more typical of the era in which the 
cases were decided. These opinions are part of a "tradition" of indif-
63. See Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise 346-47 (1976). 
64. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). The speech was deemed an attempt "to cause and incite 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of 
the United States." Id. at 212. 
65. 917,799, to be exact. Information Please Almanac 614 (41st ed. 1988). Debs 
was pardoned by President Harding in 1922. 
66. For a thorough review of this history, see David M. Rabban, The First Amend-
ment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 Yale LJ. 514 (1981). Rabban examines every First 
Amendment case before World War I, summarizing: 
The Supreme Court, with one minor exception, uniformly found against the 
free speech claimants. . .. The overwhelming majority of prewar decisions in 
all jurisdictions rejected free speech claims. . .. No court was more unsympa-
thetic to freedom of expression than the Supreme Court, which rarely pro-
duced even a dissenting opinion in a First Amendment case. 
Id. at 520, 523. 
67. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
68. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
69. See sources cited supra note 5. 
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ference to speech values that was already well-established by the time 
they were written. 
Of the many cases permitting laws that today would be considered 
clear First Amendment violations,70 Halter v. Nebraska 71 provides a par-
ticularly striking example. Despite all the popular furor surrounding 
the Supreme Court's recent decisions invalidating flag desecration stat-
utes,72 it went virtually unnoticed that the Court had faced the issue 
once before-in 1907, when it upheld a Nebraska statute banning "the 
desecration of the flag of the United States."73 
Like Gitlow and Whitney, Halter upheld a state statute. State author-
ity to censor was nothing new.74 But the post-Civil War era saw the 
evisceration of First Amendment limits on the federal government as 
70. See Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915) (affirming censorship of new spa-
per) (opinion of Holmes,].); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (uphold-
ing fines imposed on newspaper for its criticisms of Colorado Supreme Court) (The 
First Amendment does not "prevent ... punishment of such [publications] as may be 
deemed contrary to the public welfare.") (opinion of Holmes, J.); Davis v. Beason, 133 
U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding conviction for advocating bigamy). 
71. 205 U.S. 34 (1907). 
72. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v.Johnson 109 S. Ct. 
2533 (1989). 
73. Halter, 205 U.S. at 34, 34 (quoting statute). The Court's opinion, by the first 
Justice Harlan, makes interesting reading: 
From the earliest periods in the history of the human race, banners, standards 
and ensigns have been adopted as symbols of the power and history of the 
peoples who bore them. It is not then remarkable that the American people, 
acting through the legislative branch of the Government, early in their history, 
prescribed a flag as symbolical of the existence and sovereignty of the Na-
tion .... For that flag every true American has not simply an appreciation but a 
deep affection. No American, nor any foreign born person who enjoys the priv-
ileges of American citizenship, ever looks upon it without taking pride in the 
fact that he lives under this free Government. Hence, it has often occurred that 
insults to a flag have been the cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the 
presence of those who revere it, have often been resented and sometimes pun-
ished on the spot. 
Id. at 41. Harlan's unintendedly ironic juxtaposition of "free Government" with a 
barely veiled approbation of vigilante suppression of dissent shows how little speech 
values counted in the constitutional liberty calculus of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. . 
74. Indeed, it might seem tempting to ascribe the Cou;t's neglect of the First 
Amendment to the fact that the Amendment was not "incorporated" into the Four-
teenth Amendment (and thus not applicable to state laws) for most of the period I have 
described. This temptation should be avoided for three reasons. First, and most impor-
tant, it begs the question of why the First Amendment wasn't incorporated until 1925 (in 
Gitlow). It is true that most challenges to speech restrictions before the 1920s were 
framed in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the First, but the Court 
could have found speech-as it found rights to property and contract-to be among the 
essential liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. Second, the Espionage Act up-
held by Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), and Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919), was a federal statute-so even if state law cases can be disregarded, the 
Court's position remains unchanged. The third reason incorporation is a red herring is 
that when the First Amendment finally was incorporated, the Court proceeded to hand 
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well. In 1877, for example, the Court in Ex parte jackson 75 approved a 
congressional statute prohibiting distribution through the mails of a va-
riety of objectionable materials, including "lewd" books and informa-
tion about abortion-a law essentially indistinguishable from the anti-
abolition statute opposed by Calhoun forty years earlier. The Court's 
opinion injackson, written by Justice Field, refers to the abolition litera-
ture controversy: "In 1836, the question as to the power of Congress 
to exclude publications from the mail was discussed in the Senate; and 
the prevailing opinion of its members, as expressed in debate, was 
against the existence of the power."76 Justice Field reports that 
"[g]reat reliance is placed by the petitioner upon these views,"77 but 
proceeds to reject the First Amendment claims. As Justice Field's opin-
ion demonstrates, the constitutional consensus that in 1836 had limited 
federal regulation of speech, had by 1877 ceased to operate. 
The logical extension of Ex parte jackson was federal authority to 
engage in the same sort of political censorship that the states had al-
ways perpetrated. The crescendo of suppression by the federal govern-
ment was reached four decades later with the infamous Espionage Act78 
and the World War I seditious libel cases-Debs and Schenck v. United 
States 79-decided under its authority. 
B. Fanfare/or the Common Law 
The Schenck-Debs-Gitlow line of cases has baffled First Amendment 
scholars. Virtually all commentators agree that the cases were wrongly 
decided-Robert Bork being the salient exception.80 Still, the problem 
remains explaining just how the Court managed so completely to ig-
nore the seemingly clear constitutional prohibition against censorship. 
The implicit assumption in contemporary free speech scholarship is 
that the Court simply, and unaccountably, forgot about the First 
Amendment. 
In fact, Schenck, Debs, and Gitlow were the result of a complex re-
down its two most heinous (because they were decided in peacetime) anti-speech deci-
sions, Gitlow and Whitney. 
75. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
76. Id. at 733. 
77. Id. at 735. 
78. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217. 
79. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Schenck, like Debs, upheld the conviction ofa radical preach-
ing against the war. Note that Justice Holmes-hero of the Gitlow dissent and Whitney 
concurrence, and architect of the clear and present danger standard-also authored the 
opinions in both Debs and Schenck, as well as in Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 
(1919), another case affirming an Espionage Act conviction. Holmes' change of heart 
came in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), when he dissented from yet an-
other Espionage Act affirmance. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1205, 1311-17 (1983) (analyzing Holmes's 
conversion). 
80. See Bork, supra note 10, at 23-35. For the mainstream view, see, e.g., Emer-
son, supra note 5, at 63-65, 102-05; Kalven, supra note 5, at 125-66. 
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thinking, occasioned by the Civil War Amendments, of the constitu-
tional vision of liberty. These Amendments shattered the Federalist 
understanding, which had relied solely on limiting the federal govern-
ment's power to displace state law. The Civil War presented the 
Supreme Court with a wholly new task: developing a set of constitu-
tional rights enforceable against all levels of government. The Court 
responded to this challenge by locating these new rights in the common 
law. From the Civil War to the New Deal, the Court effected the consti-
tutional guarantee of individual liberty by ensuring that neither the fed-
eral government nor the states could interfere with citizens' common 
law rights to property and contract. 
1. The Structural Basis for a Constitutionalized Common Law. - The 
Schenck regime is certainly vulnerable to normative criticism. Today, 
most Americans believe that the government has the authority, even 
the duty, to regulate economic affairs-and that it has no such authority 
over speech. But, putting this normative discussion to one side,81 the, 
Court's decision to define the constitutional right to liberty as a right to 
property and contract was highly successful according to the most im-
portant criterion of constitutional interpretation: It made sense of the 
new Amendments without doing violence to the original Constitution. 
The Court's reconceptualization of the liberty ideal found ample 
support in the text and structure of the Founding document. The orig-
inal Constitution's few constraints on the states are in Article I, Section 
10. Most of these provisions are aimed at activities by states that would 
be incompatible with union: The states may not coin their own money, 
interfere with national commerce, conduct their own foreign policy, or 
raise their own armies.82 The only restriction not within this category 
(apart from the ban on titles of nobility) is the prohibition against "any 
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts." The Bill of Attainder and ex post facto Law provisions 
limit the ability of state legislatures to revise the common law; they im-
pose a partial separation of powers requirement on states by insisting 
that state legislatures may not engage in the sort of backward-looking, 
target-specific activity that is the exclusive province of the judiciary.83 
The Contract Clause is a more direct protection of the common 
law. It alone demonstrates conclusively that the Founders intended to 
safeguard the common law. The Seventh Amendment provides still 
further evidence of the Founders' concerns. By gnaranteeing the pro-
cedures of common law adjudication against federal government modi-
8l. It is retrieved infra at text accompanying notes 194-202. 
82. See Barron y. Baltimore, 32 u.S. (7 Pet.) 243,249 (1833) ("[T]he severallimita-
tions on the powers of the states ... will be found, generally, to restrain state legislation 
on subjects intrusted to the government of the Union, in which the citizens of all the 
states are interested. In these alone, were the whole people concerned."). 
83. Cf. Ely, supra note 2, at 90 (explaining federal-i.e., Art. I, § 9-version of 
these clauses as separation of powers provisions). 
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fication, the Amendment indicates the central role of common law 
rights in the Founders' conception of liberty. 
Most important, the constitutional structure accords a privileged 
position to the common law. The Founders' commitment to a limited 
national government implied a concomitant belief in the legitimacy of 
the common law. In elevating the common law's privileged position to 
the level of constitutional right, the post-Civil War Court acted to har-
monize the recent constitutional upheaval with the Founders' plan. 
The Founders had set in place a powerful array of checks aimed at 
the federal government: the separation of powers, the enumeration of 
powers in Article I, Section 8, and the Bill of Rights. To contemporary 
eyes, there appears to be a tension between the laissez-faire orientation 
of these devices and the Founders' simultaneous uncritical acceptance 
of state law. Part of this difference is traceable to the states' greater 
claims to majoritarian democracy and popular sovereignty. But in the 
main, the Founders saw no conflict, because they viewed state law-
meaning the common law-as prepolitical or "natural." They could 
understand the separation of powers as an anti-government protection 
because, to them, state law was not really government action. 
This view was mo':'e often unstated than explicit. Occasionally, 
however, it bubbled to the surface, notably in Justice Story's opinion 
for the Court in Swift v. Tyson.84 The issue in Swift was one of pure 
contract law: whether the holder of a debt could recover from the 
debtor, when the debtor had been induced to agree to the debt by the 
fraudulent promises of a third party. The suit was brought in the fed-
eral Circuit Court in New York, and the relevant transactions had all 
taken place in New York. Decisions by New York state courts indicated 
that a New York court would not permit the holder to recover; the laws 
of most other states, however, would have allowed recovery. The Cir-
cuit Court, unsure whether it was obliged to follow New York prece-
dents, certified the question to the Supreme Court. 
Story began his analysis by noting that the Judiciary Act of 1789 
required federal courts to apply "the laws of the several states" in cases 
such as this.85 But, he continued: 
In the ordinary use of langnage it will hardly be contended 
that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, 
only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves 
laws .... The laws of a state are more usually understood to 
mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative 
authority thereof, or long established local customs having the 
force oflaws.86 
Story's distinction between legislation and judge-made law rests on the 
84. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938). 
85. Id. at 18 (quoting The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34,1 Stat. 73, 92). 
86. Id. at 18. 
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assumption that common law is not positive law, not the command of 
the sovereign state, but rather an expression of natural law. When 
presented with common law issues, such as "questions of general com-
merciallaw," the Court's function is "to ascertain upon general reason-
ing and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or 
instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of com-
merciallaw to govern the case."87 To Story, common law-"general" 
law-simply reflects natural, pre-existing truths; it is not dependent 
upon the political power of the government, and its legitimacy is there-
fore unquestionable. The original Constitution took as its starting 
point this view of the common law; its particular version of the philoso-
phy of limited government assumed both that government action is in-
herently suspicious and that government "inaction" (including 
common law regulation) is presumptively legitimate. 
This view not only persisted into the post-Civil War era, but be-
came the source of the Court's retooled vision of individual liberty. In 
the wake of the Civil War, the Court could no longer understand the 
constitutional commitment to liberty simply as a set of checks on the 
federal government. The clear mandate of the Civil War Amendments 
was that henceforward states as well as the federal government would 
be subject to constitutional restrictions. But, the Civil War did not en-
tirely repudiate the federal system.88 The Fourteenth Amendment left 
in place the essential components of federalism: the states as primary 
lawmakers, and a federal government limited by separated and enumer-
ated powers and by the Bill of Rights. This system rested on a theory of 
the legitimacy of the common law. The new constitutional skepticism 
toward state law did not extend to the common law; to the contrary, the 
theory underlying the Constitution continued to regard common law 
rights as natural. The Court was to develop a set of rights to be pro-
tected from government-including state government-action, but en-
forcement of traditional common law rights did not count as action. 
The emerging institution of substantive due process took its shape 
from the contours of this hybrid understanding. The Civil War Amend-
ments presented the Court with the task of remaking the constitutional 
instantiation of the liberty ideal. The Court met this challenge by de-
claring common law property and contract rights to be inviolable. This 
solution incorporated the lesson of the Civil War-that states could no 
longer be exempt from constitutional constraint-while still adhering 
to the basic federal system the Founders had established. 
It is a mistake, then, to tbink that the Court simply forgot about the 
87. Id. at 19. 
88. As historian Eric Foner has written of the Radical Republicans responsible for 
enactment of the Civil War Amendments: "Yet if a degree of federal intervention in 
state affairs scarcely conceivable before 1860 now became possible, few Republicans 
wished to break completely with the principles offederalism." Foner, supra note 62, at 
259. 
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Bill of Rights after the Civil War. Indeed, opinions from the Schenck era 
are full of rhetoric about protecting the "the right of the individual to 
liberty" against "the power of the state to legislate."89 But, when the 
Court of that period spoke of liberty, it was concerned not with what 
are now thought of as civil liberties but with economic rights. The lan-
guage just quoted is from Lochner v. New York-the quintessential eco-
nomic liberty case. Lochner went on to define liberty as the right of an 
individual to own property, "to contract in relation to [one's] own la-
bor," and "to purchase and selllabor."90 In the Court's transformed 
understanding, protecting these rights against government abrogation 
fulfilled the commitment to liberty expressed by the Bill of Rights. One 
consequence of this position was the submergence of free speech. Be-
cause the common law provided no speech rights, the Court's new defi-
nition of liberty left speakers unprotected. 
2. The Development of a Constitutionalized Common Law. - The Lochner 
era is commonly understood as a triumph oflaissez-faire ideology, and 
not as a constitutionalization of common law rights, because the com-
mon law underpinnings of Lochner are not obvious on the face of the 
opinion itself. The constitutionalization of the common law did not 
spring full-blown from enactment of the Civil War Amendments. 
Rather, its development over time can be traced in a series of cases 
from the 1870s, '80s, and '90s in which the Court attempted to give 
meaning to the new amendments. 
The Court's first brush with this problem, the Slaughter-House 
Cases,91 decided in 1873, polarized the Court between two extremes. 
Slaughter-House involved a Louisiana statute that created a livestock-
slaughtering monopoly in New Orleans. The plaintiffs in Slaughter-
House, competing butchers, challenged this statute under all three of 
the Fourteenth Amendment's key substantive clauses-arguing that it 
deprived them of the privileges and immunities of plying their trade, 
that it deprived them of equal protection of the law by unequally appor-
tioning the license to slaughter, and that it deprived them ofliberty and 
property without due process of law. 
This claim squarely asked the Court to decide just how much the 
Constitution had been altered by the Civil War Amendments. By a 
bare five-member majority, the Court adopted a narrow reading. Jus-
tice Miller's opinion for the Court acknowledged that a momentous 
change had occurred. Miller declared that the original Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights were "historical and of another age" and that 
"within the last eight years three other articles of amendment of vast 
importance have been added by the voice of the people to that now 
venerable instrument."92 But, the opinion concluded that "we do not 
89. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,57 (1905). 
90. Id. at 58, 64. 
91. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
92. Id. at 67. 
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see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of 
the general system."93 Rather than conferring the broad economic 
rights sought by the plaintiffs, Miller's opinion limited the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the protection of African-Americans.94 
Once this limited purpose was discerned, Miller easily disposed of the 
plaintiffs' claims: the Privileges and Immunities Clause was held to 
protect only a few unarguably federal rights;95 the Equal Protection 
Clause was deemed inapposite because race was not an issue;96 and the 
statute was found not to violate the Due Process Clause because it had 
been duly enacted by the Louisiana legislature.97 
Miller's parsimony was attacked as strenuously by his colleagues as 
it is by present-day critics. Four dissenters, led by Justice Field, argued 
for a construction of the Fourteenth Amendment that would protect 
"the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens."98 Yet, 
it is easy to understand what motivated the majority. The broad read-
ing urged by the plaintiffs and the dissenters threatened to supplant the 
states altogether-"to bring within the power of Congress the entire 
domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States."99 
This, the majority knew, was not the purpose of the Civil War Amend-
ments. Miller was evidendy uneasy about relying on a slippery-slope 
argument-he wrote: "The argument we admit is not always the most 
conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the 
adoption of a particular construction of an instrument"IOO-but he re-
lied upon one all the same: 
[W]hen, as in the case before us, these consequences are so 
serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure 
from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the ef-
fect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subject-
ing them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers 
heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary 
and fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes 
the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal gov-
ernments to each other and of both these governments to the 
people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the ab-
sence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly 
to admit of doubt. IOI 
In the absence of a plausible limit to the dissenters' vision of newly-
93. Id. at B2. 
94. See id. at 71 ("[N]o one can fall to be impressed with the one pervading pur-
pose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them 
would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race .... "). 
95. See id. at 74-BO. 
96. See id. at B1. 
97. See id. at BO-B1. 
9B. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. at 77. 
100. Id. at 7B. 
101. Id. 
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federalized rights, a majority of the Court preferred Miller's narrow 
reading. 
In fact, such a limit had already been worked out by Field in his 
Slaughter-House dissent. Field's use of natural-rights rhetoric should not 
obscure his dissent's solid grounding in constitutional structure. To-
day, Field's dissent is remembered primarily for its reliance on the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause-the 
clause made defunct by Miller's majority opinion. It is a common mis-
conception, however, that Field viewed the clause as an invitation to 
formulate judicially-created fundamental rights. The "privileges and 
immunities" he believed the clause to protect were the liberties of 
property and contract enjoyed under the common law. Thus, for Field 
the crucial fact in the case was that the Louisiana slaughterhouse statute 
established a monopoly, and that "monopolies in any known trade or 
manufacture . . . were held void at common law in the great Case oj 
Monopolies." 102 
To make his case, Field compared the Fourteenth Amendment's 
language to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which 
forbids discrimination by a state against the citizens of other states: 
It will not be pretended that under the fourth article of the 
Constitution any State could create a monopoly in any known 
trade or manufacture in favor of her own citizens, or any por-
tion of them, which would exclude an equal participation in 
the trade or manufacture monopolized by citizens of other 
States. 103 
The original Privileges and Immunities Clause left the states free to 
alter the common law, but only if they were evenhanded in their treat-
ment of in-state and out-of-state citizens. The newer Privileges and Im-
munities Clause went further by taking away from the states all 
authority to infringe common law rights: 
Now, what the clause in question [i.e., Article IV] does for the 
protection of citizens of one State against the creation of mo-
nopolies in favor of citizens of other States, the fourteenth 
amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the 
United States against the creation of any monopoly 
whatever. 104 
Field saw the Fourteenth Amendment's use of the "privileges and 
immunities" phrase as important because it echoes Article IV. The 
nondiscrimination principle of Article IV draws its strength from the 
constitutional vision of the several states as belonging to a single na-
tion. The Fourteenth Amendment clause has within it a similar notion 
of rights common to the citizens of the several states. These common 
102. Id. at 101-02 (Field,J., dissenting) (citing Case of Monopolies, II Coke's Re-
ports 85 (K.B. 1602». 
103. Id. at 101 (Field,]., dissenting). 
104. Id. 
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rights were defined by the "common law of England," which "is the 
basis of the jurisprudence of the United States."105 It is the shared 
quality of common law rights which suited them so well for constitu-
tional protection. This point is evident in Field's initial statement of 
the issue in Slaughter-House: 
The question presented is ... whether the recent amendments 
to the Federal Constitution protect the citizens of the United 
States against the deprivation of their common rights by State 
legislation. In my judgment the fourteenth amendment does 
afford such protection, and was so intended by the Congress 
which framed and the States which adopted it [emphasis 
added]. 106 
Common rights, common law rights, natural rights-these concepts 
melded together in Field's vision of a Constitution newly amended to 
guarantee to each American citizen his proper birthright of fundamen-
tal freedoms. 107 
In 1873, this vision was as yet too radical for a majority of the 
Court. But, over time, as the limits to Field's theory became apparent, 
and the threat of wholesale federalization receded, the narrow reading 
adopted in Slaughter-House lost its persuasiveness. A key intermediate 
decision is Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. 
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 108 decided in 
1884, eleven years after Slaughter-House. In an interesting twist, Butch-
ers' Union continued not only the doctrinal narrative begun by Slaughter-
House but also the historical narrative of Louisiana meat-packing poli-
tics. The statute at issue in Slaughter-House was enacted in 1869, and its 
grant of exclusivity purported to extend for 25 years. In 1879, how-
ever, Louisiana adopted a new constitution authorizing municipalities 
throughout the state to regulate slaughtering and declaring void "[t]he 
monopoly features in the charter of any corporation now existing in the 
State."109 When New Orleans began to grant slaughtering licenses to 
other companies, the original statute's beneficiary sued to enjoin its 
new competitors, arguing that in granting their licenses New Orleans 
had impaired the obligations of the contract created by the 1869 exclu-
sivity statute. The opinion for the Court, again written by Justice 
Miller, rejected this claim because the 1869 Louisiana legislature lacked 
authority to enter into an "irrepealable contract."110 
105. Id. at 104 (Field, j., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 89 (Field, j., dissenting). This fonnulation recurs later in the opinion: 
"The amendment was adopted ... to place the common rights of American citizens 
under the protection of the National government." Id. at 93 (Field, j., dissenting). 
107. See id. at 105 (Field,j., dissenting) ("That amendment [the Fourteenth] was 
intended to give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights 
which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, but only recognizes."). 
108. III U.S. 746 (1884). 
109. Id. at 748 (quoting La. Const. art. 258 (1879». 
110. Id. at 749. 
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This holding was unexceptionable in the context of well-estab-
lished Contract Clause jurisprudence. The meat of Butchers' Union is in 
Justice Field's concurring opinion. Rather than relying on the Contract 
Clause, Field's opinion restated his conviction that the original Louisi-
ana statute was unconstitutional because it interfered with the common 
law: 
All grants of this kind are void at common law, because they de-
stroy the freedom of trade, discourage labor and industry, re-
strain persons from getting an honest livelihood, and put it in 
the power of the grantees to enhance the price of commodi-
ties. They are void because they interfere with the liberty of 
the individual to pursue a lawful trade or employment [empha-
sis added] .111 
This formulation was finally adopted by the full Court in Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana 112 in 1897. Allgeyer, which struck down a Louisiana statute 
regulating sellers of insurance, established the right to contract as a 
first-order constitutional guarantee. The opinion, authored by Justice 
Peckham, built in its key holding on the doctrinal foundation laid by 
Field: 
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth] [A]mendment 
means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the 
mere physical restraint of his person . . . but the term is 
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the 
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all law-
ful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood 
by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelibood or avocation, 
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be 
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a suc-
cessful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 113 
The crucial qualifiers used by Peckham-" all lawful ways" and "any law-
ful calling"-incorporated the Slaughter-House/Butchers' Union premise 
that the common law defined the extent and nature of liberties pro-
tected by the Constitution from legislative interference. The reign of 
the constitutionalized common law continued through Peckham's opin-
ion ten years later in Lochner and until the New Deal. 
This regime, though its conception of liberty was indisputably ro-
bust, nevertheless left the First Amendment unenforced. Far from 
guaranteeing free expression, common l~w actions for libel and defa-
lll. 1d. at 755-56 (Field, J., concurring). With a prophetic reference to baking, 
Field continued: 
The oppressive nature of the principle upon which the monopoly here was 
granted will more clearly appear if it be applied to other vocations than that of 
keeping cattle and of preparing animal food for market-to the ordinary trades 
and callings oflife-to the making of bread, the raising ofvegetab1es, the man-
ufacture of shoes and hats, and other articles of daily use. 
1d. at 756 (Field, j., concurring). 
112. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
113. Id. at 589. 
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mation gave public officials valuable tools for suppressing dissent. l14 
As a result, the liberty-protecting energies of the Lochner regime were 
focussed entirely on economic rights, and not at all on speech rights. 
These two themes of post-Civil War liberty jurisprudence-inviola-
ble property rights and devalued speech rights-intersected neatly in 
Davis v. Massachusetts, 115 a decision handed down two months after All-
geyer. The State of Massachusetts convicted Davis for violating a Boston 
ordinance prohibiting any "public address" on "public grounds" "ex-
cept in accordance with a permit from the mayor."1l6 Davis appealed 
to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice White, speaking for a unanimous 
Court, disposed of the case in three pages: Because the Boston munici-
pality owned the property on which Davis had spoken, it could restrict 
his behavior in whatever ways it wanted. 117 To the Davis Court, Bos-
ton's right to regulate behavior in its parks was conferred by the munic-
ipality's ownership of public property: "For the legislature absolutely 
or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is 
no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than 
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."IlS Davis had 
no constitutionally cognizable right to speak on public land because he 
had "no proprietary right" in the land.Il9 
111. FREE SPEECH IN THE NEW DEAL ERA 
The jurisprudence typified by Davis persisted until the late 1930s, 
when the New Deal brought about a second transformation of the con-
stitutional understanding of liberty. In a series of cases in the late 
1930s and early '40s, the Supreme Court approved federal and state 
regulatory programs that dramatically rearranged common law market 
relationships.120 This legitimation of the activist state repudiated the 
114. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. 
115. 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
116. Davis. 167 U.S. at 44 (quoting Boston, Ma., Rev. Ordinances § 66 (1893». 
117. Id. at 46-47. 
118. Id. at 47 (quoting with approval Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 
1895». 
119. Id. The early flag desecration case, Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), 
similarly frames a speech claim in terms of property rights: "It is familiar law that even 
the privileges of citizenship and the rights inhering in personal liberty are subject, in 
their enjoyment, to such reasonable restraints as may be required for the general good. 
Nor can we hold that anyone has a right of property which is violated by such an enact-
ment as the one in question." Hatter, 205 U.S. at 42. 
120. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942) (upholding production 
quotas of Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941) (upholding wage and hour requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding federal unemployment 
insurance system of Social Security Act of 1935), NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act of 1935), and West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage statute) with 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating acreage reduction provisions of 
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prior era's constitutionalization of rights to property and contract. At 
the same time, the New Deal presented the Court with wholly new chal-
lenges to individual liberty. Not only did the post-New Deal govern-
ment possess unprecedented interventionist powers, but it 
consolidated these powers within relatively unaccountable administra-
tive agencies. Faced with the task of reconstituting the Founding com-
mitment to liberty in response to these challenges, the Court 
invigorated the Bill of Rights' non-economic guarantees of personal 
freedom-most energetically, the speech and press clauses of the First 
Amendment. 
A. The Rebirth of Free SPeech 
The Schenck-Gitlow-Davis regime came to a precipitous end in the 
late 1930s. The clearest sign of the break is Lovell v. Grijfin,121 decided 
in 1938. The issue presented in Lovell-the validity of a municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting the distribution of handbills without a permit-was 
virtually identical to that decided by the Court 40 years earlier in Davis. 
But without even mentioning Davis, the Lovell Court unanimously122 
invalidated the statute. 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond scope of congressional power), 
Moorehead v. New York ex reI. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating state mini· 
mum wage statute under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as 
exceeding Commerce Clause power), A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating National Industrial Recovery Act on separation of 
powers and Commerce Clause grounds), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 
(1918) (invalidating Child Labor Act as exceeding Commerce Clause power). 
Professor Ackerman has argued that the election of 1936 effected a constitutional 
amendment. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale 
LJ. 453, 510-14 [hereinafter Constitutional Politics]; Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lec· 
tures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013, 1051-57 (1984) [hereinafter 
Storrs]. This argument really has two parts. Ackerman's historical argument, which I 
accept wholeheartedly and draw upon extensively, is that the New Deal was a decisive 
watershed in constitutional law. The second part of the argument aims at justifying the 
Court's actions as legitimate. This part of Ackerman's argument rests on a series of 
normative premises about the nature and purposes of judicial review. I do not wish to 
embrace these premises unequivocally, nor need I for the present. 1 claim here only that 
the Court's free speech jurisprudence experienced a major shift in the 1930s, and that 
subsequent doctrinal developments reflect the Court's effort to understand the First 
Amendment within a broader framework of constitutional principle. 
121. 303 U.S. 444 (1938); see also Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (over· 
turning state conviction under anti-communist censorship statutes); Grosjean v. Ameri· 
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down special tax on newspapers). The cases 
of the late 1930s were anticipated by two earlier decisions, Stromberg v. Califoruia, 283 
U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating state criminal syndicalism statute) and Near v. Minnesota 
ex reI. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating state statute authorizing injunctions 
against defamatory newspapers). 
122. EightJusticesjoined the Lovell majority;Justice Cardozo did not participate in 
the decision. 
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A few months later, in Hague v. CIO, 123 the Court displayed the 
robust extent of its newfound emphasis on free speech. The Hague 
Court enjoined Jersey City officials from enforcing an ordinance 
prohibiting the distribution of printed materials in public places. Jus-
tice Roberts' plurality opinion brushed Davis aside: 
We have no occasion to determine whether, on the facts dis-
closed, the Davis case was rightly decided, but we cannot agree 
that it rules the instant case. Wherever the title of streets and 
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.124 
By 1938, the Court had reversed completely its direction of the previ-
ous seven decades. The jurisprudence set in place by Lovell and Hague 
continues to the present. Later cases, such as New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van 125 and Brandenburg v. Ohio 126 are often seen as achieving the zenith 
of the free speech trajectory, but contemporary free speech absolutism 
had become firmly established within the first decade of the New Deal 
era. In fact, by 1946 the Supreme Court gave speech rights precedence 
even over private property rights. Marsh v. Alabama 127 involved a com-
pany town-Chickasaw, Alabama-owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding 
Corporation. AJehovah's Witness had been convicted of trespass for 
distributing handbills on a Chickasaw street corner. The Court over-
turned the conviction, holding that the First Amendment forbade the 
use of trespass laws to interfere with free speech. The triumph of 
speech rights over property rights in Marsh demonstrates the complete 
reversal of values effected by the New Deal.128 
The transition from the Davis/Schenck era to the Hague/Marsh era 
123. 307 u.s. 496 (1939). 
124. Id. at 515 (plurality opinion). 
125. 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964) (establishing "actual malice" test for libel of 
public figure). 
126. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (subversive advocacy is protected "except where [it] 
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action"). 
127. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
128. Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an 
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in gen-
eral, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti-
tutional rights of those who use it .... Whether a corporation or a municipality 
owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in 
the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of commu-
nication remain free. 
Id. at 506-07. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which 
held that mandatory pledges of allegiance in schools violated the First Amendment, con-
tains similarly robust language: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... " Id. at 642 (plurality opinion of 
Jackson, J .). 
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was as abrupt as the contrast between them is striking. Hague and 
Marsh were not the result of incremental advances in a "tradition" of 
ever-growingjudicial sensitivity to speech claims. First Amendmentju-
risprudence experienced a fundamental disjunction in the 1930s. The 
Court's entire approach to individual liberty changed, down to the ba-
sic aims animating its decisions. Common law rights to property lost 
their constitutional protection. Speech rights, previously unrecog-
nized, became dominant. 
These two developments were related. The primary constitutional 
achievement of the New Deal period was the repudiation of Lochner's 
enshrinement of property and contract rights. The breakthrough deci-
sion was West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,I29 which upheld a state law setting 
minimum wages. After West Coast Hotel-the "switch in time"-the 
Court went on to ratify the entire New Deal agenda. I30 The cases ap-
proving New Deal initiatives have rightly been seen as the most impor-
tant of the period, and the law they made-that government regulation 
of the economy is constitutionally legitimate-is rightly seen as the key 
jurisprudential product of the New Deal. 
The New Deal's legitimation of government activism had ramifica-
tions beyond the sphere of economic rights. It remade the entire con-
stitutional landscape, forcing a thorough reworking of the Court's 
conception of liberty. While constitutionalized common law rights 
were inconsistent with the interventionist state, the Justices had no in-
tention of abandoning the Bill of Rights, or the liberty imperative which 
animates it. Rather than seeing the New Deal as having discredited lib-
ertarianism altogether, the Court understood that the activist state 
posed new and different threats to individual liberty, and that it re-
quired the development of a correspondingly reformulated theory of 
constitutional liberty. It was in response to this challenge that the 
Court articulated the absolutist First Amendment theory that domi-
nates contemporary jurisprudence. 
The connection between the demise of Lochner and the rise of free 
speech is evident in two historical markers. The first is the debate in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee on Roosevelt's Court-packing propo-
sal. I31 In these remarkable hearings-truly the crucible in which the 
modern Court was forged-the passing of one jurisprudential era and 
the birth of another is palpable. The critical fact to remember about 
the defeat of Court-packing is that the Senate Committee that rejected 
the bill was dominated by New Deal Democrats. Witness after witness 
and Senator after Senator stated that they supported Roosevelt, that 
129. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
130. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941). 
131. See Reorganization of the FederalJudiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) [hereinafter, Hearings]i S. 
Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). 
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they favored the New Deal program, that they believed the Court was 
wrong to strike it down, but that they opposed Court-packing.132 The 
function of the Supreme Court in protecting individual liberty was sim-
ply too important. 
Roosevelt's concentration of authority frightened even many sup-
porters of the President's initiatives. Liberals and moderates, as well as 
conservatives, saw in some aspects of the New Deal agenda the poten-
tial for excess. In 1937, this potential seemed far from abstract. The 
rise of fascism in Europe inspired a deeply sober caution in advocates 
of State interventionism. At the hearings, witnesses and Senators re-
peatedly suggested that without the Court, the United States might fall 
prey to the sort of dictatorship that had taken over Germany and It-
aly.133 These fears helped to prevent a complete victory by Roosevelt. 
Just as the Anti-Federalists had succeeded in forcing a Bill of Rights 
into the Federalist Constitution, those who in the 1930s feared the 
overweening power of the activist state were able to insist that the post-
New Deal constitutional order retain an independent judiciary capable 
of restraining the popular branches. 
When it came to specifying the Court's proper role, the witnesses 
and Senators regularly pointed to the First Amendment guaranties of 
freedom of speech and conscience. Pierce v. Society of Sisters 134 and Meyer 
v. Nebraska,135 two of the handful of pre-New Deal cases to uphold liti-
gants' First Amendment claims, came to signify the good work that the 
Court does, work that the Senators felt strongly it must be permitted to 
continue to do. The Committee report on the bill, after citing Society of 
Sisters, concludes with a matchless repudiation: "It is a measure which 
should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again be 
presented to the free representatives of the free people of America."136 
The second marker of the new era, representing the Supreme 
Court's full absorption of the lessons of the Court-packing hearings, 
was United States v. Carolene Products Co. 137 That decision, issued be-
132. See Hearings, supra note 131. Among the prominent New Dealers who op-
posed Roosevelt's bill were Senator Burton K. Wheeler, see id. at 485-519, and kitchen-
cabinet member Raymond Moley, see id. at 539-90. 
133. See, e.g., id. at 674-76 (statement of Sen. Connally); id. at 700 (statement of 
Fred Brenckman); id. at 767 (statement of Erwin N. Griswold); id. at 864-65 (statement 
of Dorothy Thompson); id. at 1029 (statement of Oswald Garrison Villard). 
134. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating state statute requiring enrollment in public 
schools). 
135. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state law prohibiting teaching oflanguage 
other than English in elementary school). In light of Professor Ackerman's explanation 
of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as a product of the New Deal transfor-
mation, see Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 120, at 541 & n.184, it is inter-
esting that both Society of Sisters and Meyer, which figured so prominently in the Court-
packing hearings, were relied upon by Justice Douglas in formulating the penumbral 
right to privacy. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-83. 
136. S. Rep. No. 711, supra note 131, at 23. 
137. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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tween Lovell and Hague, contains the Court's most significant an-
nouncement of the rebirth of the Bill of Rights. Justice Stone's famous 
footnote four cited Lovell to illustrate the questionable constitutionality 
of legislation "within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments."138 It is no accident that this tip-of-
the-hat to speech rights occurred in one of the landmark abandonments 
of Lochner doctrine. Stone's remark is more than simply an allusion to 
the Court's new sympathy for First Amendment plaintiffs. It signals 
that the Court's focus on free speech is a direct consequence of the 
New Deal repudiation of property rights as an avenue for fulfilling con-
stitutional commitments to individual liberty. 
B. The Structural Basis for a Robust First Amendment 
The connection between the emergence of the activist state and 
the Court's tum to the First Amendment is much deeper than merely 
that Marsh filled the void left by the repudiation of Lochner. Speech, 
along with the other non-economic aspects of the Bill of Rights, was 
more than simply a convenient context for the Court's refocussed ef-
forts to protect a sphere of individual freedom. The Justices' choice to 
elaborate a powerful and comprehensive set of civil liberties fit bril-
liantly with their contemporaneous reconception of the government's 
regulatory role. The Court's rediscovery of the First Amendment fol-
lowed directly from the transformation of government structure 
wrought by the New Deal. 
1. The Needfor Majoritarian Control. - The New Deal completed the 
nationalization of government begun by the Civil War. The Civil War 
Amendments began the move from a state-centered to a nation-cen-
tered system, and the New Deal placed constitutional authority squarely 
in the federal government. But, the structural consequences of the two 
reform episodes were quite different. The primary institutional benefi-
ciary of the Civil War Amendments was the federal judiciary. The 
Amendments' nationalization was effected through new constitutional 
limits on the states, limits that were enforced by the federal courts.139 
In contrast, the New Deal implemented its nationalization by ex-
panding the powers of Congress and the President. The resulting juris-
prudence of liberty was sharply different from the Civil War era's 
constitutionalization of common law rights. 
The New Deal reforms caused two basic changes in constitutional 
doctrine. First, they expanded the Commerce Clause power to reach 
even the most intra-state activities.140 This eviscerated the constitu-
138. Id. at 152 n.4. 
139. That is a simplification. The Civil War Amendments certainly expanded the 
power of Congress as well, most obviously in § 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. Never-
theless, the separation of powers and the (expanded list of) enumerated powers contin-
ued to limit federal lawmaking capability. 
140. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (validating quotas on wheat 
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tional check of enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8. Second, the 
New Deal ahandoned the constraint of separated powers by endowing 
administrative agencies with sufficient power to regulate autono-
mously.141 This consolidation of power combined with the expansion 
of the Commerce Clause to produce wholesale nationalization. Freed 
from the necessity of obtaining the consent ot multiple branches to 
governmental action, the agencies rapidly accelerated the substitution 
of federal regulation for state law. 
Underlying hoth of these structural transformations, and the na-
tionalization impulse generally, was a new constitutional understanding 
of the common law. The New Dealers repudiated the central tenet of 
the Founding framework: that government which governs best, gov-
erns least. They denied the Federalist assumption that market distribu-
tions were somehow natural or prepolitical. With this appreciation of 
public responsibility for inequality came a recognition that government 
inaction is not inherently more legitimate than government action. As 
the myth of the prepolitical common law dissipated, the case for re-
straints on the federal government weakened. Federal initiatives came 
to seem less like new law and more like better law.142 
Fueled by these insights, the New Deal's twin repudiations of con-
stitutional tradition, its nationalization and centralization of power, re-
placed the Founders' system of federalism with an administrative state. 
Under the Federalist system, states were the primary lawmakers, over-
seen by a federal government with authority to displace state law when 
required by the collective national interest. After the New Deal, admin-
istrative agencies replaced the states as the default lawmakers. 
These changes undermined the rationale for constitutional protec-
tion of common law rights. But, as the Court-packing hearings demon-
strated, the legitimation of economic interventionism did not obviate 
not intended for commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding 
federal government power to set minimum wages for goods expected to move inter-
state); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (lack of 
adequate accommodations for blacks inhibits interstate commerce). 
141. See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Whether the 
agencies are considered to be part of the executive or a new "fourth branch," the point 
is the same: Their ability to promulgate rules, implement policies, and make case by 
case determinations, all under the same roof, effectively destroyed the separation of 
powers. I have detailed the New Deal's repudiation of the separation of powers, and 
outlined thejurisprudence of agency control that took its place, in David Yassky, Note, A 
Two-Tiered Theory of Consolidation and Separation of Powers, 99 Yale LJ. 431 (1989). 
142. This new understanding of the common law is evidenced by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("whether the law of 
the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a 
decision is not a matter of federal concern"). 
After reading this Article in draft, Tom Hentoffpointed out that dispelling the myth 
of the prepolitical common law gave impetus not only to nationalizing forces, but also to 
proponents of states' rights. Once the mask of common law neutrality was lifted, laying 
bare the conflict between nation and state, partisans on both sides emerged. 
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judicial articulation of the constitutional commitment to liberty. The 
New Deal had eliminated two of the three constitutional constraints on 
government action, the enumeration and separation of powers, but the 
third prong, the Bill of Rights, remained intact. Indeed, the unabashed 
activism of the post-~ew Deal federal government made a sphere of 
individual liberty all the more important. 
Instead of abandoning the liberty principle of the Bill of Rights, 
the post-New Deal Court took up the challenge of countering the dan-
ger to liberty posed by the administrative state. This danger was 
neither-as in the Federalist era-that the central government would 
quash institutions of local attachment, nor-as in the Civil War era-
that traditional common law entitlements would be wiped away, but 
rather that the modern administrative state is powerfully anti-
democratic. 
At the same time its reach was extended, the government 
threatened to escape the grasp of majoritarian democracy. The Foun-
ders' commitment to popular government was eclipsed by the New 
Dealers' commitment to administrative expertise. Agency experts are 
not democratically accountable; government is less popular than it was 
before the New Deal. While elected officials used to be directly in-
volved in lawmaking, now they are primarily overseers, acting to set the 
direction of agency policymaking and to correct agency excesses.143 
Faced with these challenges, the Court turned its attention to the 
processes of control over the government: politics and elections. En-
hanced judicial attention to the political process became necessary to 
counter the threat of administrative tyranny. Because government as a 
whole is less democratic, ensuring the integrity of electoral mechanisms 
became crucial. As Roosevelt himself observed: "[W]e have built up 
new instruments of public power. In the hands of a people's Govern-
ment this power is wholesome and proper. But in the hands of political 
puppets of an economic autocracy such power would provide shackles 
for the liberties of the people."144 Free speech absolutism aims to fore-
stall such shackles by protecting the distribution of political resources 
against government manipulation. In the Court's post-New Deal for-
mulation, the First Amendment prohibits government from interfering 
143. See Yassky, supra note 141, at 437-38 (describing post-New Deal separation 
of powers doctrine, under which regulatory power is consolidated in administrative 
agencies and supervisory authority is divided among original branches); cf. Peter L. 
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1984), (administrative agencies constitute "fourth 
branch" overseen jointly by original branches). 
144. 5 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 16 (1941). I speculate 
that concerns like this may have directly influenced some of the early decisions in the 
First Amendment renaissance. For example, Hague v. CI0, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying note 124), was a notoriously authoritarian machine 
boss. See William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 275-76 
(1963) (characterizing Hague as "local tyrant"). 
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with citizens' political activities-just as Lochner prohibited government 
from interfering with their economic activities. 
With social orderings so highly politicized, the Court perceived 
that libertarianism in the post-New Deal regime required a limit not to 
governmental reach but to governmental autonomy. Formerly, the 
state had been prohibited from disturbing market allocations of wealth; 
after the New Deal, the state was forbidden to counter citizens' at-
tempts to enforce government accountability. The Court shifted its ap-
plication of the principle of liberty from the context of political 
outcomes to the context of political participation, defined as the pro-
cess by which citizens exercise control over the state. Consider again 
Carolene Products: Justice Stone cited nine then-recently decided First 
Amendment cases for the proposition that "legislation which restricts 
... political processes ... [perhaps should be] subjected to more exact-
ing judicial scrutiny."145 
2. The Unleashed Judiciary. - The demise of federalism and of sepa-
ration of powers had one further impact on the development of the 
Supreme Court's liberty jurisprudence. The Court has been much 
more inventive-some would say fanciful-in developing free speech 
doctrine than it was in articulating Lochner-era economic rights. This 
so-called judicial activism has been much rebuked. But, in fact, the 
changed character of judicial review is directly traceable to the distinc-
tive role of the judiciary in the post-New Deal system. For the modern 
Court, the process of assessing litigants' claims necessarily involves a 
level of judicial creativity far higher than that required of earlier 
Courts. 
In the Federalist period, the Court could ascertain a citizen's rights 
by looking to state law, as modified by applicable federal statutes. Judi-
cial review was limited to ensuring that federal statutes were enacted in 
compliance with Article I, Section 8, the Bill of Rights, and the separa-
tion of powers. The Civil War Amendments added a step. Ifa litigant's 
claim depended on a state or federal statute, the Court was required to 
measure that statute against common law rights to property and con-
145. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938). Shades of 
Professor Ely's representation-reinforcement theory are evident in the argument here. 
For a fuller discussion of Ely's theory, see infra text accompanying notes 176-178. 
Carotene Products marks the rebirth not only of the First Amendment but of the entire 
Bill of Rights. The enormous body of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine is al-
most entirely a creation of the post-New Deal era. Like free speech law, much of this 
doctrine can be understood as a response to the Court's concerns about the anti-demo-
cratic tendencies of the administrative state. For example, the primary purpose of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), and its progeny, is to safeguard the role ofthe jury as a key institution of demo-
cratic participation. Juries are second only to elections as fora in which citizens scruti-
nize, and even occasionally nullify, official action. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 
Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ. 1131, 1182-99 (jury is central mechanism of 
democratic accountability protected by Bill of Rights). 
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tract. Although this development gave the Court access to new sources 
for its decisions-with the result that many more laws were declared 
unconstitutional-the Court continued to rely on an existing body of 
doctrine. 
The task of the post-New Deal jUdiciary is qualitatively different. 
For the first time, the constitutional liberty guarantee depends not on a 
ready-made body of doctrine-the common law-but on rights devel-
oped and articulated by the federal courts themselves. The courts have 
had to fill in, more or less from scratch, the blanks in the general consti-
tutional command to protect political liberties. There is no common 
law definition of speech, as there is of property or contract. To deter-
mine the constitutionality of a statute, it is no longer sufficient simply to 
decide whether the state or the federal government is the appropriate 
decision-maker in a particular policy area (the Federalist-era calculus), 
nor to compare the statute with long-established common law rights 
(the post-Civil War calculus). Instead, to vindicate the Constitution's 
commitment to individual liberty, the courts have been required 
actively to elaborate a comprehensive set of judicially-enforced 
guarantees. 146 
This process is often perceived as illegitimate 'judicial activism." 
It is not my intention in this Article to address such criticisms, but two 
points are worth making here. First, critics of "activism" are correct in 
noting that much of what the modem Court does can properly be 
called lawmaking. The rules of law governing what is and is not 
"speech," and what speech is protected, have been generated by the 
Court itself. The second point is that regardless of whether one thinks 
such rule-making is an appropriate judicial function, it is indisputably 
embedded in the governmental structure left in place by tbe New Deal. 
In this sense, at least, the Court's "activism" is legitimate: It derives 
from the Constitution's concurrent commitments to interventionism 
and majoritarianism, as embodied in the concrete institutions of admin-
istrative agencies and a judiciary willing and able to enforce political 
rights. 
C. Libertarianism in an Activist State 
Despite the magnitude of the New Deal changes, there remain sig-
nificantjurisprudential continuities with the pre-New Deal era. In shift-
ing from economic liberty rights to political liberty rights, the Court 
retained the essential structure of the constitutional liberty formula: 
protecting private resources against government redistribution. The 
146. This is the "counter-majoritarian" tendency that Alexander Bickel identified 
in the contemporary Court. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: 
The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16-23 (1962). Although Bickel provided the 
definitive analysis of this trend, he failed to appreciate that the "difficulty" became se-
vere only after the New Deal and that the trend is related to transformations in the 
structure of the federal government. 
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difference is that in the post-New Deal era it is political-participation 
resources not wealth resources that are protected against government 
redistribution. What the Court has done with First Amendment doc-
trine is to create a libertarian sphere modeled on its earlier instantia-
tion of constitutional liberty principles. 
Two cases decided in the 1980s reflect the Court's recognition of 
speech as a constitutionally protected individual liberty: Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California 147 and PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins .148 Pacific Gas involved a newsletter distributed 
by PG&E, a privately owned utility, in its monthly billing envelopes. 
Toward Utility Rate Normalization ("TURN"), a consumer activist or-
ganization that regularly opposed PG&E in ratemaking proceedings, 
petitioned the California PUC to either forbid PG&E to distribute the 
newsletter or require the utility also to distribute a response authored 
by TURN. The PUC agreed with TURN's arguments, ordering that the 
"space remaining in the [PG&E] billing envelope, after inclusion of the 
monthly bill"149 had to be divided between PG&E and TURN. 
The Court overturned this order, holding that "compelling a pri-
vate corporation to provide a forum for views other than its own . . . 
infringe[s] the corporation's freedom of speech." 150 The violation has 
three facets: PG&E is forced to respond to TURN's speech;151 a chil-
ling effect will deter PG&E from addressing controversial issues, so as 
to avoid provoking TURN;152 and readers may mistakenly attribute 
TURN's views to PG&E.153 
The PG&E interest vindicated by the Pacific Gas Court seems re-
markably similar to a property right: It prohibits state appropriation of 
property for the use of promoting speech. Indeed, Professors Fiss and 
Michelman have both interpreted Pacific Gas and other recent cases 154 
as a return by the Court to the Lochner regime of protecting wealth from 
political invasion. 155 
This argnment is on to something important, but it is not quite 
right. Compare Pacific Gas with PruneYard, decided six years earlier. 
l47. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). 
148. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
l49. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 6 (plurality opinion) (quoting material that the parties 
submitted to the Court). 
150. Id. at 9 (plurality opinion). 
151. See id. at 10, 15 (plurality opinion). 
152. See id. at 10 (plurality opinion). 
153. See id. at 15 (plurality opinion). 
154. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (overturning 
restrictions on political advertising by corporations); Buckley v. Val eo 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
(overturning restrictions on campaign spending and contributions). 
155. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 
1406-07 (1986); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional 
Idea of Property, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1320 & n.7 (1987) (Pacific Gas exemplifies judi-
cial hostility to the "distributive" conception of constitutional property rights). 
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PrnneYard is the last in a long and highly controversial line of cases 
dealing with speech in shopping centers. In cases prior to PruneYard, 
the Court had established that the First Amendment does not confer a 
right to use privately owned shopping centers for political speech;I56 
this doctrine is consistent with the FisslMichelman reading of Pacific 
Gas. 
PrnneYard added a twist. The case involved a group of high-school 
students seeking to distribute pamphlets in a privately owned shopping 
center in California. The California Supreme Court granted the stu-
dents a right to use the shopping center for protest activities under the 
free speech provision of the California Constitution. The U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that property owners have no con-
stitutional right to exclude speakers. While the First Amendment does 
not compel a shopping center to open its doors to speakers, neither 
under PrnneYard does it prohibit a state from imposing such 
compulsion. 
This holding is in tension with Pacific Gas. Just as the PUC tried to 
force PG&E to share its resources with other speakers, so the California 
Constitution forced PruneYard Shopping Center to enable competing 
speech. But, the Pacific Gas rationales of forced response, chilling ef-
fect, and false attribution apply equally to shopping centers. In fact, 
the dissent in Pacific Gas claimed that "the right of access [denied] here 
is constitutionally indistinguishable from the right of access approved 
in PrnneYard."I57 
Nonetheless, the cases can be distinguished. Justice Marshall 
noted the critical factor in his Pacific Gas concurrence: 
The ... difference between this case and PrnneYard is that the 
State has chosen to give TURN a right to speak at the expense 
of [PG&E's] ability to use the property in question as a forum 
for the exercise of its own First Amendment rights. While the 
shopping center owner in PrnneYard wished to be free of un-
wanted expression, he nowhere alleged that his own expres-
sion was hindered in the slightest. In contrast, the present 
case involves a forum of inherently limited scope. I5S 
Not all property rights, then, can be related to the First Amendment. 
156. The Court's first brush with this issue, Amalgamated Food Employees Union 
Loca1590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 309 (1968), upheld a union's First 
Amendment right to picket a non-union store in a privately owned shopping center. 
Logan Valley, however, was narrowed by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 564 (1972) 
(First Amendment does not protect speech that has "no relation to any purpose for 
which the [shopping] center was built and being used"), and was overruled by Hudgens 
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (First Amendment does not protect speech on pri-
vately owned property). The open question decided by PruneYard, then, was whether a 
state can grant more expansive speech rights than those contained in the federal 
Constitution. 
157. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 26 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
158. Id. at 23-24 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). 
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The issue for the Court is not whether property rights are infringed but 
whether the infringement reduces the owner's ability to speak. Simply 
owning property does not give rise to a First Amendment right to deny 
its use to others, even when the use is for others' speech. For a First 
Amendment right to obtain, the property must be characterized as a 
speech resource. The envelope space in Pacific Gas can be so character-
ized, but the shopping center in PruneYard cannot. 
While not a right to property, though, the Pacific Gas/PruneYard 
right is a property-like right reminiscent of Lochner. The key similarity 
is that both are founded on a distinction between market distributions 
and political distributions; in both cases, market distributions are 
treated as "natural" or prepolitical. Just as Lochner did for property, 
Pacific Gas and PruneYard enshrine private orderings of speech re-
sources. These private orderings are assumed to be legitimate and be-
yond the reach of state intervention.159 
This assumption underlies a wide range of contemporary First 
Amendment doctrine. A particularly important example is the line of 
cases initiated by Buckley v. Valeo,160 the landmark case striking down a 
congressional statute limiting political campaign expenditures. At the 
heart of the Buckley holding is a refusal to rearrange presumptively le-
gitimate distributions of speech resources: "[T]he concept that gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in 
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment .... "161 The premise underlying this position is that 
there is a "natural" political process which, ifleft untouched, cannot be 
deficient. Restrictions on campaign expenditures are impermissible be-
cause they disturb this process. This view is precisely analogous to 
Lochner's faith in market relationships and condemnation of govern-
ment interference. 
The most recent contribution to the Buckley case law,Austin v. Mich-
igan Chamber oj Commerce, 162 deviates from earlier precedents by uphold-
ing a state regnlation prohibiting certain corporate political 
expenditures. But, the Court justifies its deviation not by repudiating 
the Pacific Gas/PruneYard assumptions, but by explaining that they do 
not apply in this particular case. The statute upheld inAustin regnlated 
only corporate entities. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Mar-
159. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 883-84 
(1987) (First Amendment jurisprudence takes existing distributions as natural and 
protected). 
160. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (invalidating application of Federal 
Election Campaign Act restrictions to certain expressly political nonprofit organiza-
tions); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a Massa-
chusetts criminal statute that forbade certain expenditures influencing referendum 
proposals as violative of speech rights). 
161. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
162. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). 
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shall, seizes on the fact that corporations enjoy "unique legal and eco-
nomic characteristics" to establish that the regulation at issue is an 
exception to the normal Buckley rule: "State law grants corporations 
special advantages ... that enhance their ability to attract capital and to 
deploy their resources .... "163 The government, in other words, has 
already intervened in the speech arena by granting "special advan-
tages" to corporations. Because the natural distribution of speech re-
sources has thereby been disturbed, the Court reasoned, a 
countervailing restriction is permissible. "We emphasize that the mere 
fact that corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth is not 
the justification for [the restriction]; rather, the unique state-conferred 
corporate structure that facilitates the amassing oflarge corporate trea-
suries warrants the limit on independent expenditures."I64 
The Austin exception makes plain the assumptions implicit in the 
Buckley rule: the political process is natural, not a product of govern-
ment policy. Wealth-based disparities in political power are legitimate 
and constitutionally protected. Only when disparities in political power 
can be traced to state "intervention" is further, remedial intervention 
constitutional. The libertarian world view underlying Lochner has been 
transported wholesale into the First Amendment.165 
IV. LESSONS LEARNED: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
I have tried in this Article to make sense of the First Amendment 
by using "the method of inference from the structures and relation-
ships created by the constitution in all its parts."166 The key insight of 
this "holistic"167 method is that First Amendment doctrine is and has 
been formulated to achieve goals far broader than the toleration of dis-
sent. Throughout its history, the First Amendment has been inter-
preted as part of a larger constitutional framework. 
Using this holistic approach, I have identified three distinct eras of 
the First Amendment. This history belies the popular belief that con-
temporary free speech jurisprudence sprang full-blown from the Foun-
ders' vision. Perhaps more surprising, the three-part history is equally 
163. Id. at 1397. 
164. Id. at 1398. 
165. The Buckley principle was recently applied in Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. 1759 
(1991), the abortion counseling case. Rust upheld a regulation prohibiting clinics re-
ceiving federal funds from counseling women about abortion. The Court's decision 
hinged on the premise that First Amendment constraints lapse when the government 
enters a field of public debate. 
166. Charles Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 7 (reprint ed. 
1985). 
167. Professor Ackerman has devoted much of a recent book review to a call for 
"holistic" interpretation. See Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 
Yale LJ. 1419 passim (1990) (reviewing Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 
(1990». 
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at odds with orthodox scholarly accounts. Since Levy, most scholars 
accept the premise that the Founders' conceptions of free speech were 
. vastly different from modem notions. But, rather than seeking to un-
derstand the purpose of the First Amendment in the original constitu-
tional scheme or in subsequent ones, scholars have simply drawn a line 
of upward progress connecting the early censorious cases to today's 
liberal decisions. This progressive vision, though comforting, does not 
fit the facts. 
Academic blindness to the true history of the First Amendment is 
due in large part to weaknesses in the conventional method of constitu-
tional scholarship. Virtually all First Amendment scholars are clause-
bound rather than holistic.168 They take as their task deciphering the 
constitutional prohibition against "abridging the freedom of speech, 
and of the press." Apart from these words of the Amendment, the 
sources clause-bound scholars draw on in performing their task tend to 
be limited to remarks in the Philadelphia Convention and the ratifica-
tion debates concerning freedom of speech and press; contemporary 
evidence, such as libel trials, of the Founders' beliefs in this area; and 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the First Amendment. Those 
scholars who do go beyond these materials look not to sources bearing 
on constitutional structure, but to philosophers of tolerance and, more 
recently, of semiotics.169 
Not only does clause-bound interpretation provide an inadequate 
account of the First Amendment at any given point in time, it also dis-
ables the interpreter from accurately perceiving doctrinal change. The 
conventional model carries with it an implicit assumption of gradual-
ism. For the clause-bound scholar, the questions posed by the First 
Amendment are constant over time, and the materials with which the 
Court attempts to answer them are also essentially invariant. Conse-
quently, clause-bound scholars see change as coming from a steady ac-
cretion of wisdom. The much used image of a "free speech 
tradition,"17o with its connotations of incremental progress and unitary 
focus, encapsulates the clause-bound view. 
The holistic model, in contrast, sees that developments in First 
Amendment doctrine have been linked to structural transformations in 
the Constitution. This leads to a picture of change very different from 
the gradualist "tradition" image. Because the goal of coherence among 
various interrelated constitutional doctrines is paramount, change in 
168. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Soci-
ety 5-6 (1986) (focusing on judicial interpretation of the text of the First Amendment 
because there is "precious little evidence to reveal [the Founding Fathers'] intentions"); 
Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression 4-5 (1984) (concerned with values underlying 
First Amendment rather than holistic understanding of Constitution). 
169. See, e.g., Bollinger, supra note 168, at 204-12; Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 
9-34. 
170. See Kalven, supra note 5, at 3. 
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any particular doctrine is constrained by the overall structural vision. 
Most of the time, this constraint will permit little or no change, in ser-
vice of maintaining an overall coherence. When one part of the Consti-
tution is reconceptualized, however, change in other doctrines may be 
quite sudden. Rather than a tradition, then, the holistic model envi-
sions "punctuated equilibria"I71-10ng periods of relative stasis inter-
rupted by trans figurative eruptions. 
The history described in Parts I, II, and III demonstrates the weak-
nesses of the clause-bound approach and the superiority of the punc-
tuated equilibria model. Change in First Amendment doctrine has 
been episodic and revolutionary, rather than constant and incremental. 
The Founders' First Amendment consensus remained stable until the 
Civil War, after which the federal government's capacity to regulate 
speech expanded greatly. The egregious censorship of the early twen-
tieth century, a plain contravention of the Founders' ideals, ill fits the 
conventional picture of gradual progress. Lacking the interpretive 
tools to explain this period, clause-bound scholars simply ignore it. 
Nor does the First Amendment's rebirth in the 1930s conform to the 
orthodox paradigm of an ongoing and seamless tradition. The Court's 
tum to free speech burst out of nowhere. The tectonic forces that 
drove this rediscovery are invisible without an understanding of the 
contemporaneous emergence of a constitutionally sanctioned activist 
state. For a full understanding of constitutional doctrine and of doctri-
nal change, interpretation must be holistic. 
A. Holistic, Structural, and Historical Interpretation 
The holistic method, though little-used by contemporary constitu-
tional scholars, is by no means new. Charles Black called for just such 
an approach in a 1968 lecture series, published as Structure and Relation-
ship in Constitutional Law. 172 In this section, I comment briefly on three 
scholars who have taken up Black's clarion call: David AJ. Richards, 
John Hart Ely, and Bruce Ackerman. 173 These three are salient excep-
171. I borrow the phrase "punctuated equilibria" from theorists of evolutionary 
biology. See Niles Eldredge & StephenJ. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative 
to Phyletic Gradualism in Models in Paleobiology 82 (Thomas J.M. Schopf ed., 1972); 
SJ. Gould & R.C. Lewontin, The spandrels of San Marco and the panglossian paradigm: 
a critique of the adaptationist programme, B205 Proc. Royal Soc'y London 581 (1979). 
172. Black, supra note 166, at 3. The holistic method, of course, predates Black 
considerably. Black himself describes the prevalence of holism in Founding-era consti-
tutional interpretation. Id. at 13-32. 
173. Two additional efforts deserve attention. Professor Kogan has done for the 
law of personal jurisdiction what I have attempted to do for free speech. See Terry S. 
Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 257 (1990). 
Using a holistic approach, he has explained watersheds in personal jurisdiction doctrine 
as part of the larger constitutional transformations brought about by the Civil War and 
the New Deal. 
Professor Amar's recent work on the Bill of Rights both presents the Bill as a coher-
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tions to the reign of "clause-bound interpretation," yet their accounts 
are nonetheless, for one reason or another, incomplete. Contrasting 
their work with the explanations offered here may helpfully illuminate 
the features of the particular holism 1 am advocating. 
Professor Richards, in two recent books,174 has undertaken the 
same project that this Article attempts: He seeks to interpret individual 
constitutional clauses, including the First Amendment, 175 in the light of 
a general theory of the Constitution. For Richards, this unifying theory 
is essentially Lockean liberalism. He perceives that the various provi-
sions of the Founders' Constitution were connected thematically by 
their -commitment to protecting absolute rights of property and con-
science and to maintaining the requisite elements of the government's 
political legitimacy. Richards' exegesis of the First Amendment follows 
directly from this thematic vision. 
The problem with this account is that Richards is stuck in the 
Founding era. The description he provides was accurate in 1800, but 
today it is outmoded-not by the mere passage of time, nor by the pro-
gress of moral philosophy, but by two concrete and thoroughgoing 
overhauls of the constitutional structure. The Lockean commitment to 
limited government, and its concomitant definition of political legiti-
macy, have been decisively excised from the Constitution. 
Professor Ely's approach to constitutional interpretation is also ho-
listic, but his description of the coherent whole is very different from 
Richards'. To Ely, the central purpose of the Constitution is "repre-
sentation-reinforcement" -perfecting the processes of democratic ac-
countability. Ely justifies much of the contemporary First Amendment 
orthodoxy as an effort at achieving this goal. 176 
Ely is more up to date than Richards. In fact, representation-rein-
forcement is a fair description of the PruneYard-Pacific Gas principle that 
I believe underlies modem First Amendment jurisprudence. Yet Ely is 
vulnerable to the same criticism that can be levelled at Richards: ahis-
toricism. While Ely has captured the essence of post-New Dealliberta-
ent whole and draws connections between the Bill and the original Constitution. See 
Amar, supra note 145. Some of the structural themes sketched in part I, supra, are 
presented more elaborately in Amar's article. See also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Feder-
alist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. 
Rev. 205, 229-50 (1985) (holistic account offederaljurisdiction). 
174. David AJ. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (1986) [hereinafter Tol-
eration]; David AJ. Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism (1989) [here-
inafter Foundations]. 
175. See Richards, Toleration, supra note 174, at 165-230; Richards, Foundations, 
supra note 174, at 172-20l. 
176. Ely, supra note 2, at 105-16. Interestingly, in an earlier essay Professor Ely 
used very traditional methods of constitutional analysis to arrive at the conclusion that 
flag-desecration laws violate the First Amendment. See John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: 
A Case Study in tbe Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analy-
sis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1975). 
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rianism, he fails to appreciate that regime's place in a succession of 
constitutional frameworks. The first two eras of constitutionaljurispru-
dence differed sharply from the modem period. In neither was the 
Court concerned primarily, or even significandy, with "policing the 
process of representation" or "facilitating the representation ofminori-
ties," to take two of Ely's chapter tides. These foci emerged only after 
the New Deal transformation. 
Ely's neglect of history is important because it leads him to misun-
derstand the origins and underlying premises of the jurisprudential re-
gime he otherwise accurately describes. He arrives at the right answer 
but for the wrong reasons. Ely settles on the representation-reinforce-
ment theory because it is, he argues, the only account of judicial review 
consistent with the Constitution's fundamentally democratic and 
majoritarian premises.177 In actuality, as we have seen, the move to 
representation-reinforcement resulted from the Court's rethinking of 
the problem ofliberty posed by the modem activist state. The versions 
of the Constitution that held sway from the Founding to the Civil War, 
and from the Civil War to the New Deal, exhibited as much commit-
ment to the democratic ideaP78 as the current version, yet they con-
tained few if any representation-reinforcing imperatives, whether of the 
First Amendment variety or otherwise. The rise of these political rights 
guarantees was required to counterbalance the loss of democratic par-
ticipation inherent in the administrative state. 
Bruce Ackerman is a third follower of Black. But, unlike Richards 
and Ely, Ackerman's constitutional scholarship is deeply historical. In 
two recent articles, Ackerman has sketched a constitutional history cen-
tered on the three "constitutional moments" of the Founding, the Civil 
War, and the New Deal. 179 He has described the resulting Constitution 
of today as the Court's "synthesis" of the "higher law" made during 
these three episodes. 
This Article has tracked Ackerman's three-part historical schema 
quite closely. Its effort at "synthesis," however, has taken a path differ-
ent from Ackerman's. Ackerman attributes to each moment a defining 
principle, commitment to which was enshrined in the Constitution by 
the higher-lawmakers of the respective periods: Moment One stands 
for individual liberty, Moment Two for equality, and Moment Three for 
177. As Professor Ackerman has pointed out, this explanation can be criticized on 
its own terms for its conflation of democracy and majoritarianism. See Ackerman, 
Storrs, supra note 120, at 1035-38, 1047-49. 
178. In contemporaries' eyes, at least. It remains an open question whether consti-
tutional decisions made in an era of slavery, and of exclusive male suffrage, deserve the 
deference of later generations. 
179. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 120; Ackerman, Storrs, 
supra note 120. This sketch will be elaborated in a forthcoming book, We The People. 
The comments made here, while I believe they fairly treat the argument in Ackerman's 
published work, may not be appropriate to the fully developed argument in We The 
People. 
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activist government. Ackerman then synthesizes these principles, inter-
preting Brown v. Board of Education, for example, as embodying the 
Fourteenth Amendment's commitment to equality in an arena of ac-
tivist government-the public scbools-brought to the constitutional 
forefront by the New Deal. 180 
In contrast to this principle-focused approach, I have emphasized 
the concrete institutions and mechanisms that were set up to imple-
ment these principles. This approach is structural as well as holistic. 
This is not to say that principles should be ignored. It would be per-
fectly ridiculous to talk about the Fourteenth Amendment without at 
some point discussing slavery. After all, constitutional structures are 
no more than devices for implementing principles. 
For just this reason, though, focussing on structure is at least as 
productive as studying principle. Ultimately, principle-interpretation 
and strnctural-interpretation should prove equivalent-the right equals 
the remedy. Compare, for example, Ackerman's claim that Lochner was 
a product of the Civil War ascendance of free labor ideology181 with 
this Article's claim that it was a constitutionalization of the common 
law. As we have seen, the architect of the Lochner doctrine was Justice 
Stephen Field. It is true that Field believed fervently in free labor. In-
deed, Field was as committed a judicial reformer as any who has fol-
lowed him to the bench. The disfavor in which his beliefs are now held 
should not obscure the warmth of the passion which animated his opin-
ions, as when, in Butchers' Union, he declared that "the right to pursue 
... [t]he common business and callings of life ... is a distinguishing 
privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of 
that freedom which they claim as their birthright."182 
It is crucial, however, that Field's ideological commitment to lais-
sez-faire found expression through the constitutional structure of the 
common law. In its privileged treatment of common law, the Constitu-
tion echoed Field's own conviction that economic rights were funda-
mental. Field believed that the web of relationships and rights 
established by the common law were indispensable to, even constitutive 
of, civilized society-and so did those who set up the original constitu-
tional framework, with its multiple safeguards against common-Iaw-dis-
180. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 120, at 527-36. 
181. See id. at 518-19; William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor 
and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 767, 772-94 (discussing the Slaughter-
House Cases and competing interpretations of "free labor" during the post-Civil War pe-
riod); cf. William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of 
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 554-59 (1974) 
(linking jurisprudential approaches of antislavery movement and post-Civil War 
Supreme Court jurisprudence). See generally Foner, supra note 62 (discussing rise of 
free labor ideology). 
182. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent 
City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., III U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., 
concurring). This passage is followed by a lengthy quotation from The Wealth of Nations. 
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placing federal action. This bias toward the common law was only 
strengthened by the Civil War Amendments. If the connection be-
tween free labor ideology and Lochner is more than coincidence, so too 
is the decision's reliance upon the common law for its definition of fun-
damental rights. Had there not been at the heart of the constitutional 
plan a structure that embodied laissez-faire, Field's vision could not 
have triumphed. 
All I have shown so far is that principle and structure are two ways 
of talking about the same thing. I now want to highlight three advan-
tages of the structural approach-advantages that enable a fuller ac-
count of constitutional change than principle-interpretation can offer. 
First, looking at the structures of separation of powers and federal-
ism focuses the interpretive eye. "Liberty" and "equality" are roomy 
concepts. Trying to specify with precision the Philadelphia delegates' 
conception of liberty, or the Reconstruction Congress' intention to 
promote equality, much less to apply these ideas to contemporary 
problems, presents a host of interpretive problems. The structural 
method, while hardly mechanical, nonetheless provides a helpful 
discipline. 
The second advantage of structural interpretation is that the Con-
stitution, both as written and as interpreted by courts, speaks the lan-
guage of practice rather than theory. True, the Preamble consecrates 
the document to "secure the Blessings of Liberty," but the body of the 
Constitution is concerned with creating offices and institutions, detail-
ing the way these structures relate to one another, and allocating deci-
sion-making authority among them. The essence of the document is its 
translation of principle into a tangible set of practices; interpretation 
must follow this lead. 
Third, and most important, the structural method attunes the in-
terpreter to the crucial impact of structure itself on constitutional 
change. When people set out to reform institutions, the existing con-
tours of these institutions often playa decisive role in determining the 
direction of the change. Political reform movements are almost always 
channelled through existing structures of political participation, 
strengthening some and weakening others. Once insurgents occupy 
the existing institutions, their new perspective may influence their vi-
sion of desirable reform. 
These forces of bureaucratic determinism, plain on a micro level to 
political scientists and students of organizational behavior,183 operate 
183. There is a rich literature in political science and sociology suggesting that in-
stitutional structure is a powerful determinant of governmental response to social 
problems. See, e.g., Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Domestic and International 
Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy, in Between Power and Plenty: For-
eign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States 19-21 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 
1978); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 734 (1984); Margaret Weir & Theda 
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as well on the macro level of constitutional change. In describing the 
three eras of the Constitution, I have tried to show that each new pe-
riod built on what came before. Neither the "founders" of the post-
Civil War regime, nor those of the New Deal era, were free to remake 
the constitutional order from scratch. Not only would such total revo-
lutions have been politically unachievable, they would have been incon-
ceivable. Existing institutions and structures shaped the way the 
relevant actors thought about concepts like liberty and articulated their 
aspirations. After the Civil War, for example, the Court in searching 
for a way to express the Constitution's revised vision ofliberty naturally 
turned to the already privileged common law, and elevated it to a posi-' 
tion of inviolability. The innovation was that the responsibility for pro-
tecting these rights was taken from the states and given to the federal 
judiciary. 
This innovation itself became a structure that conditioned subse-
quent constitutional evolution. The Court-packing hearings show that, 
by the New Deal, the no.tion that courts are necessary to check the ex-
cesses of popular government was already well-ingrained. The New 
Deal changed the mandate of judicial review, and gave the Court an 
added measure of independent authority to define this mandate, but 
these mutations, rather than creating a new institution from whole 
cloth, grew from an established set of practices. 
Much constitutional evolution follows this pattern: Seen in a new 
light, and with new purposes in mind, old institutions take on new pow-
ers and begin to perform new functions-yet, many of their original 
characteristics inevitably persist. Just as natural selection puts a spe-
cies' existing attributes to newly-important uses, the Constitution has 
changed through adaptation. Successor regimes have been constructed 
from the available materials of their predecessors. Sensitivity to this 
process will yield a wealth of insight into the nuances of contemporary 
doctrine. For interpretation to be fully successful, it must be not only 
holistic and not only historical, but structural as well. 
B. Toward a New Scholarship of the First Amendment 
The account of the First Amendment offered in this Article has one 
further implication for constitutional scholarship. Scholars' normative 
inquiries, as well as their descriptive efforts, must be broadened beyond 
the issues raised by a particular constitutional clause. To this point, 
this Article has been concerned solely with description. Articles such as 
this one, which seek to rationalize a body of law, are often meant to 
confer legitimacy on the explained opinions. But, 1 come not to praise 
the First Amendment, but to bury it-or rather to praise it only faintly. 
Skocpol, State Structures and the Possibilities for "Keynesian" Responses to the Great 
Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United States, in Bringing the State Back In 107 
(Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985). 
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Recent critics have powerfully challenged the justice of reigning 
First Amendment paradigms. Professors Fiss184 and Michelman185 
note that the Court's particular brand of free speech absolutism per-
mits moneyed interests to dominate public debate. Professor MacKin-
non has taken this critique another step, arguing that traditional First 
Amendment jurisprudence enforces sex oppression.186 
These criticisms should come as no surprise now that we have per-
ceived the essential similarity between Lochner and Buckley-or, for that 
matter, Texas v. Johnson,187 the flag-desecration case. This unsavory 
provenance should prompt legal commentators to reconsider the John-
son decision. In contrast to the public outrage that greeted the deci-
sion, First Amendment scholars cannot have been displeased-or even 
particularly surprised-by Johnson. Flag burning is not a controversial 
issue among law professors. The Johnson holding, and that of the fol-
low-up case United States v. Eichman, 188 fit squarely within any of the 
conventional doctrinal frameworks propounded by academic commen-
tators. These scholars see Johnson and Eichman as the capstone to our 
grand First Amendment tradition. To them, the holdings embody the 
First Amendment guarantee of pluralistic political discourse.189 
184. See Fiss, supra note 155, at 1406-07; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv. 
L. Rev. ~81, 785-88 (1987); see also Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censor-
ship, 100 Yale LJ. 2087 passim (1991) (applying theory of earlier articles to case of 
government subsidies to the arts). 
185. See Michelman, supra note 155, at 1340-50. 
186. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 195-214 
(1989) [hereinafter, Feminist Theory]; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister: 
Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, in Feminism Unmodified 163, 165-67, 172-74, 
178 (1987). Although MacKinnon's critique deals specifically with obscenity law, the 
force of her argument-that for the powerful, the right to speak includes the right to 
legitimate their power and to insinuate its effects into the cognitive structures of the 
powerless-extends to other areas of First Amendment doctrine as well, and it compre-
hends power hierarchies other than gender. To take as an example the paradigmatic 
orthodox issue of subversive advocacy: Brandenburg implicitly assumes that the only 
speech that can be equivalent to force is speech by the powerless that threatens the 
political status quo. The opinion's analysis is built on the world view that speech uncon-
nected to revolutionary violence neither effects coercion, nor permits coercion, nor is 
fueled by coercion. 
187. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). 
188. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (invalidating flag-desecration statute enacted by Con-
gress in effort to circumvent Johnson). 
189. Almost all of the law review articles focusing onJohnson have applauded the 
Court's decision, for more or less the expected reasons. See Robert Goldstein, The 
Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap: An Historical, Political, and Legal Analysis, 45 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 19,67 (1990) (arguments for flag burning law are "hopelessly inadequate"); Ar-
nold H. Loewy, The Flag-Burning Case: Freedom of Speech When We Need It Most, 68 
N.C. L. Rev. 165, 175 (1989); Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the First 
Amendment, 66 Ind. LJ. 511, 522-24 (1991) (''johnson posed an easy first amendment 
issue"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 7510wa L. Rev. Ill, 114 
(1989) (Court's decision in Johnson "was clearly correct and essentially uncontroversial 
as a matter of both precedent and principle"); C.L. Welborn, Texas v. Johnson: The 
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I have already discussed the historical fallacy in this view. Its nor-
mative fallacy is just as great. Johnson's commitment to pluralistic dis-
course is shallow at best. Its assumptions-the Pacific Gas/PruneYard/ 
Buckley assumptions-about the political process are no more defensi-
ble than Lochner's assumptions about the market. Just as the formal 
equality to "purchase and sell labor" masked from critical examination 
the injustice of the worker-owner relationship, so too the formal equal-
ity to purchase communications resources and the formal equality of 
"one person-one vote" obscure the reality of maldistributed political 
power. 
A few days after the Supreme Court decided Eichman, the Louisi-
ana House of Representatives passed a bill to reduce the maximum 
penalty for battery from $500 and one year in prison to $25-in cases 
where the battery is part of a "flag-burning incident."19o This bill was 
an invitation to "private" enforcement of a norm where public enforce-
ment would violate the Constitution. It underscores the New Dealles-
son that common law rights are neither prepolitical nor "neutral." It is 
not true that the natural state of affairs is that people have a right to 
bum flags, or that the only danger to this right is a federal or state 
statutory prohibition. There simply is no natural state of affairs. Either 
I can bum a flag with impunity, or I do so at the risk of violent retalia-
tion by the state or by "private" onlookers. In either case, my real 
rights-my actual, day-to-day ability to do things-are very much the 
product of government (in)action. If the Constitution wants me to have 
the right to bum a flag, it may have to do more than to leave untouched 
the pre-existing distribution of rights and resources; it may have to ac-
tively reach into those arrangements and remake them. 
Flag burning may seem to some a trivial example, but there are 
more terrible illustrations. The violence-plagued elections of the late-
Reconstruction South show as clearly as anything in our history that 
formal political equality does not guarantee genuine democracy.191 
The Voting Rights Act notwithstanding, this truism is still valid. If the 
Constitution pledges to each citizen an opportunity to participate in 
political debate, it is insufficient to say, as Johnson says, that the "rem-
United States Supreme Court Reaffirms the Very Principles For Which the American 
Flag Stands, 64 Tu!. L. Rev. 265, 270 (1989); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading 
Cases, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 137,249-59 (1989). But see Douglas W. Kmiec, In the After-
math ofjohnson and Eichman: The Constitution Need Not Be Mutilated to Preserve the 
Government's Speech and Property Interests in the Flag, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 577, 
577-83,637-38 (criticizingJohnson and Eichman); cf. Mark Tushnet, The Flag-Burning 
Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 39,47 (1990) (Johnson pro-
voked debate of constitutional proportions among citizenry). 
190. Flag Bill Gains in Louisiana, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1990, at A14. The bill did 
not pass the Louisiana Senate. 
191. See Foner, supra note 62, at 342-43, 569-76, 603-04. 
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edy" for problematic speech is simply "more speech."192 In a political 
environment dominated by moneyed interests, genuinely pluralistic de-
bate requires the government to go beyond laissez-faire. 
Rather than seeking to prohibit government intervention, First 
Amendment jurisprudence should acknowledge the pervasiveness of 
government "action" and forthrightly address the real moral issues at 
stake. While the Court's protection of flag burners is unexceptionable, 
the Court's opinions are sadly lacking in this sort of normative discus-
sion. Another little-noticed fact about Texas v. Johnson is that on the 
same day it was decided, the Court handed down another First Amend-
ment decision, Florida Star v. BJ.F. ,193 overturning a state court award 
of damages to a rape victim whose name had been published-contrary 
to state law-in a newspaper. Comparing these two holdings illustrates 
the Court's blindness to the relationship between speech and private 
power. Mr. Johnson's speech is protected precisely because it is power-
less; under Brandenburg, speech that actually may cause insurrection is 
censurable. In contrast, the Florida Star is a tremendously powerful 
speaker; it caused real and severe harm to BJ.F.-and to women as a 
group, to the extent that publicity makes rape victims less likely to re-
port the crime and consequently lessens rapists' fear of punishment. 
The doctrine underlying both decisions succeeds only in reinforcing 
existing power relationships. 
But this is only half the story. Just as clause-bound interpretation 
inhibits understanding of past constitutional change, so too it unduly 
narrows the focus of normative inquiry. Judges deciding First Amend-
ment cases are not free to follow only their conceptions of justice; if 
nothing else, commitment to a structurally-coherent Constitution ex-
erts interpretive constraint. Because clause-bound scholars reduce the 
Constitution to a series of discrete philosophical problems, they do not 
see this constraint. Again, the image of a free speech tradition is defi-
cient. By taking the problem of the First Amendment to be the prob-
lem of tolerance in a liberal democratic polity, clause-bound scholars 
conflate interpretive legitimacy and justice. 
Once these distinct criteria are separated, it must be acknowledged 
that the Court's First Amendment decisions are solidly grounded in the 
structural relationships and imperatives that animate the post-New Deal 
Constitution. Who can deny that our Constitution intends, as a first 
principle, to protect a libertarian sphere-that it presupposes a firm 
distinction between the state and civil society? In one of the most juris-
prudentially significant cases of the past few years, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed-unsurprisingly, if to some disappointingly-this basic con-
stitutional distinction. 194 Even political philosophers who reject funda-
192. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring». 
193. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989). 
194. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 
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mental liberal ideals typically advocate a healthy civil society of one sort 
or another.195 It is simply not credible to argue that our constitutional 
lawmakers have ever rescinded their initial commitment to 
liberalism. 196 
After the New Deal's eradication of the state/civil society dichot-
omy in the economic sphere, the Court's relocation of it in the political 
sphere seems well justified. At the least, contemporary free speech 
opinions fit with the jurisprudence of earlier eras to produce a coher-
ent, two-centuries-Iong constitutional narrative. While coherence is no 
substitute for justice, such a narrative has the genuine value of helping 
to constitute the United States as a republic and its citizens as republi-
cans. The Supreme Court's fealty to the past enables a continuing con-
versation between the public and its governing institutions. 
If the legal academy is to contribute to this debate, theorists will 
have to abandon the clause-bound understanding of constitutional 
change. They will have to explain existing doctrine holistically, as the 
product of historical and structural determinants. They will have to un-
derstand that new free speech regimes will arise only in conjunction 
with more sweeping changes, and that First Amendment critiques must 
therefore be linked to broader visions of reform. Finally, they will have 
to appreciate who the true agents of reform will be. Constitutional ref-
ormation cannot and will not be accomplished by the courts alone. 
Scholars seeking to promote change must bear in mind that judicial 
decisions are based on fundamental constitutional decisions whose ori-
gins lie outside the judiciary. 
If we don't like the constitutional law we have, perhaps it is be-
cause we don't like the Constitution we have. If the Court's interpre-
tive judgments are valid, then our recourse lies not with the Court but 
with the lawmakers. For this reason, reflexive opposition to proposals 
for constitutional change-such as those that followed the flag-burning 
decision-is misplaced. Efforts to amend the First Amendment ought 
not to be feared if they will spark a public debate on the constitutional 
meaning and scope ofliberty. Before the academy can welcome such a 
debate, however, it will have to replace the now-prevalent idea of adju-
dication as philosophy with a holistically informed understanding of ad-
judication as interpretation. 
In conclusion, I want to sugges~ that legal scholars have once 
1006 (1989) (holding that father's abuse of child does not constitute state action for 
purposes of Fourteenth Amendment, even where government agency had cause to know 
of abuse). 
195. See, e.g.,Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 1-31 (1975); Michael Walzer, 
Spheres of Justice 31-64 (1982). 
196. A recent student note has helpfully demonstrated the Constitution's liberta-
rian commitments by linking them to the liberal principles articulated in the Declaration 
ofIndependence. See Dan Himmelfarb, Note, The Constitutional Relevance of the Sec-
ond Sentence of the Declaration ofIndependence, 100 Yale LJ. 169, 186 (1990) (Foun-
ders' regime was "liberal primarily, democratic only secondarily"). 
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before faced a decision between these two conceptions of constitution-
alism. In the early decades of this century, the legal realists launched a 
devastating attack on the interpretivist orthodoxy.197 The links be-
tween legal realism and the critical legal studies movement have been 
thoroughly explored,198 but it is worth pondering for a moment the 
historical rather than jurisprudential parallels. Two strands are dis-
cernible in both movements. First came articles debunking the putative 
neutrality of law, exposing the power relationships and exploitation 
that law both enforces and legitimates.199 Fueled in part by these in-
sights, a second camp of scholarship moved toward legal nihilism, 
questioning the very possibility of the rule of law.2oo 
These two types of argument, though separable, are related. They 
are related because it becomes much easier to lose one's faith in law the 
more one is aware of the manifold injustices perpetrated in the name 
of, and with the help of, law. The realists, having realized that the sup-
posedly neutral right to contract functioned as a right to cheap labor 
for employers and as no right at all for workers, grew suspicious of the 
motives of the judges who came up with the right to contract. The con-
temporary attraction of indeterminacy may similarly be driven by a 
growing realization among legal scholars that the Court's assumptions 
about the fairness of the political process and the legitimacy of political 
resource distributions are unfounded. As it becomes clear that particu-
lar legal regimes benefit some and harm others, the essence of the legal 
craft may itself seem tainted.201 
197. For the Realists, however, interpretivism meant reasoning from past judicial 
decisions; the interpretivism attacked by present-day critics takes as' its sources of law 
authoritative acts by democratically legitimate lawmakers. 
198. See, e.g., Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Busb, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 
1669 (1982) (criticallegaI scholars locate "genesis of today's crisis" in "Realist legacy" 
and continue abandoned Realist project). 
199. Outstanding examples on the legal realist side include Morris R. Cohen, Prop-
erty and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q, 8, 11-13 (1927); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of 
Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 562-71 (1933); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribu-
tion in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q, 470, 470 (1923). For corre-
sponding critical legal studies work, see Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of 
Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale LJ. 997, 1106-08 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1725-37 (1976). 
200. The paramount realist statement is Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 
(1930) (seeming authority oflaw derives from unresolved Oedipal conflicts oflawyers 
and judges). While the realists were inspired by then-(relatively)recent research into 
human psychology, critical legal studies' claims about indeterminacy borrow instead 
from literary theory. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 
96 Yale LJ. 743 (1986) (advocating application of literature scholars' theories of 
"deconstruction" to legal interpretation); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 
Texas L. Rev. 373 (1982). 
201. Specific picturings of the interpretive process may in fact bear this taint. For 
example, Professor MacKinnon argnes persuasively that the epistemological stance of 
objectivity or neutrality is distinctively patriarchal, in that it enables men to define as 
reality their situated perceptions. See MacKinnon, Feminist Theory, supra note 186, at 
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Yet, we can agree with attacks on law's neutrality while denying 
law's impossibility. Indeed, claims of radical indeterminacy disap-
peared after the 1930s in submission to the inescapable reality of the 
New Deal's success in using law to effect social progress. When law 
became in tune with the popular consensus on political morality, the 
process of translation from lawmaker to judge seemed less mysterious 
and implausible. _ 
There is every reason to hope that this history will be repeated-
that the not-too-distant future will see a legal realignment and concom-
itant revival of legal faith. Just as the realists presaged the New Deal, 
the critical legal studies movement has been building an intellectual 
foundation for a political critique of the constitutional status quo. In 
the 1930s, realist attacks on Lochner's assumptions about the legitimacy 
of market wealth distributions became part of Roosevelt's political pro-
gram. Perhaps contemporary scholarly insights into the need for redis-
tribution of political resources will percolate through to the speeches 
and proposals of present-day reformist politicians. 
Instead of rejecting at its outset a debate about free speech, pro-
gressive and feminist scholars would best further their goals by sharp-
ening their critiques of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, 
and by developing their work into alternative conceptions of liberty. 
The remarkable success of Jesse Jackson's candidacy in the 1988 presi-
dential election suggests that leaders espousing such progressive ideas 
might command considerable popular support.202 Like-minded mem-
bers of the legal community can best serve these .leaders hy carefully 
explaining the Constitution we have now and by clearly articulating the 
Constitution we ought to have. 
161-70 (1989); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
Toward FeministJurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 636-37 (1983). But 1 do not read MacK-
innon as ruling out a non patriarchal theory of interpretation; she requires only that in-
terpreters not objectify their texts. 
202. Jackson received over 7 million votes in the 1988 Democratic Party primaries, 
about 25% of the party electorate. See Gwen Ifill, Jackson Awaits '2nd Phase' of Cam-
paign, Washington Post, June 8, 1988, at AIO. His platform explicitly criticized the 
plutocratic bias of current political institutions. See, e.g., Excerpts from Jackson'S 
Speech: Pushing Party to Find Common Ground, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1988, at A18 
(speech at Democratic convention assailing "economic violence"). 
For an example of work by a legal scholar toward a vision of constitutional liberty 
that moves past the current orthodoxy and that might serve as the basis for a new juris-
prudence, see Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 Yale LJ. 1409 (1991). 
